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ENFORCEABILITY OF FORUM SELECTION
CLAUSES: A “GALLANT KNIGHT” STILL
SEEKING ELDORADO
Nathan M. Crystal*
Francesca Giannoni-Crystal**
*Distinguished Visiting Professor Charleston School of Law
** Member of New York Bar and of Ordine degli Avvocati di Firenze

INTRODUCTION
Forum selection clauses (“FSC”) are very common in both
domestic and international contracts. In Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore
Company (“Bremen”),1 the Supreme Court established basic standards
for the enforceability of such clauses. Relying on Bremen standards,
courts today generally enforce FSCs. However, the vagueness of the
Bremen standards leaves room for a party to resist enforcement. The
result may be delay and inefficiency. The Supreme Court has said that
an arbitration clause is a form of FSCs2, but it has applied different
standards for the enforcement of arbitration clauses from FSC. 3 This
article argues for a reformulation of the Bremen standards in case of
international commercial agreements, subjecting FSCs to the same
standards that apply to arbitration in general. Under this approach
courts will discard vague concepts, such as “reasonableness” and
“fairness,” and will restrict the public policy limitation to that

* Nathan Crystal has been teaching, writing, and consulting in the fields
of contract law and professional ethics for more than forty years. He is the
author of four books and numerous articles on ethics and contract law, both
domestic and international. Professor Crystal has lectured internationally in
Italy, Australia, and China. He is admitted to practice in South Carolina and
Georgia.
** Francesca Giannoni-Crystal is a dually-qualified U.S. and Italian
attorney. She is admitted as avvocato in Italy, as an attorney in New York, and
certified as a foreign legal consultant in South Carolina (not a member of the
South Carolina Bar). Her practice has focused on transactional work,
particularly international and technological contracts and corporate matters.
The authors are the founding members of Crystal & Giannoni-Crystal,
LLC.
1
M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
2
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
3
See infra pts. I at B, III at B.
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applicable to ordinary contractual terms.
The analysis of the
enforceability of a FSC should apply only to the FSC itself not the
contract as a whole.4 This approach will both protect the reasonable
expectations of the parties as reflected in their contract and will
increase commercial and judicial efficiency.
This article argues also for two other changes in the law regarding
interpretation of FSCs: (1) A FSC should be interpreted according to
the law of the chosen court. This interpretation should apply not only
when the parties have included a choice-of-law clause in their
agreement but also when they have failed to do so. (2) In addition, as a
matter of policy, a FSC should be interpreted as exclusive, unless the
clause contains clear language to the contrary. These interpretations
reflect the majority view as expressed in international conventions on
jurisdiction and arbitration, 5 and, more importantly, they carry out the
reasonable expectations of the parties.
This paper deals with FSCs in commercial international
transactions. We intend by “commercial” a transaction in which no
natural person acting primarily for personal, family, or household
purposes is a party. Thus, this article does not apply to FSCs in
consumer contracts. We intend by “international,” a transaction that is
not local. A local transaction is a transaction in which all the parties
are resident in the same country and their relationship and all other
elements relevant to their dispute (other than the choice of the foreign
court) are connected only with that country. 6
Part I of this paper discusses some basic concepts regarding FSCs
and deals with the evolution of their enforceability before and after
Bremen. The section concludes by identifying a number of stillunanswered questions. Part II compares the treatment of these clauses
in international treaties. Part III draws a parallel with the treatment of
arbitration clauses. The discussion of the analogy between arbitration
and FSCs lays the ground work for the argument that the enforceability
standard for arbitration clauses and FSCs should be the same. Part IV
provides answers to the unsolved questions identified in Part I. These
answers are based on principles of freedom of contract, efficiency,
4

This is the “separability” doctrine applicable to arbitration clause. See
infra notes 195-99 and accompanying text.
5
See infra pt. II.
6
Hague Convention on Private International Law, Convention on Choice
of Court Agreements art. 1, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294, available at
http://www.hcch.net/upload/expl37e.pdf. See infra notes 142-85 and
accompanying text.
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historical development, and international uniformity. Part V is a short
conclusion.

I.

THE MEANING AND EVOLUTION IN THE ENFORCEABILITY OF
FSCS

A. The Meaning and Traditional View on the Enforcement of FSCs
A FSC is a “contractual provision by which the parties establish
the place (such as the country, state, or type of tribunal) for specified
litigation between them.”7 A FSC has the function of consenting to the
jurisdiction of the chosen forum. In addition, the clause could bar
litigation elsewhere. A clause that does bar litigation elsewhere is
sometimes referred to as an “exclusive” FSC.8 Historically, the
prevailing approach in the U.S. was that exclusive FSCs were
unenforceable because they violated public policy, namely they
“ousted” courts of jurisdiction to decide the dispute. 9
The Supreme Court never decided a case adopting the old
approach to FSCs. The closest the Court came was in Carbon Black
Export, Inc. v. The Monrosa.10 The holding is actually quite narrow;
the decision is a dismissal of certiorari as improvidently granted 11 but
being the only decision of the Supreme Court before Bremen, it is
worth describing the case in some detail. The facts are very similar to
the facts of Bremen (see below): Carbon Black Export, Inc., a Delaware
corporation, brought a libel in admiralty in a Texas federal district court
for damages to a shipment of goods “during an ocean voyage from
7

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 681 (8th ed. 2004).
See Baker v. Impact Holding, Inc., No. 4960-VCP, 2010 WL 1931032
(Del. Ch. May 13, 2010) (enforcing an exclusive FSC providing for suits only
in state or federal court in Dallas, Texas).
9
See, e.g., Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9 n.10 (citing cases following traditional
approach); Mut. Reserve Fund Life Ins. Ass’n v. Cleveland Woolen Mills, 82
F. 508 (6th Cir. 1897) (holding that a stipulation in a policy of life insurance
that no suit in law or in equity shall be brought upon it except in the circuit
court of the United States is contrary to public policy, and invalid).
10
The Monrosa v. Carbon Black Exp., Inc., 359 U.S. 180 (1959).
11
A short explanation for non-American readers: The Supreme Court,
after having accepted a case for review, may decide against further review of
the case when the justices feel that the case does not present the constitutional
issues in a clear-cut way and they prefer to defer adjudication of these issues
until a more suitable case comes before the Court. Usually the Supreme Court
takes such action with a per curiam opinion without explanation, but the Court
did more in Carbon Black.
8
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Houston and New Orleans to various Italian ports.”12 The libel was in
rem against the ship, the S.S. Monrosa, “then in the port of Houston on
another voyage,” and in personam against its owner, Navigazione Alta
Italia (“NAI”), an Italian corporation.13 NAI moved the district court to
decline jurisdiction because the parties had agreed, “in the bills of
lading covering the shipment, that controversies in regard to cargo
damages should be settled only in the courts of Genoa, Italy.” 14 The
clause in question read as follows:
27. -- ALSO, that no legal proceedings may be
brought against the Captain or Shipowners or their
Agents in respect to any loss of or damage to any
goods herein specified except in Genoa, it being
understood and agreed that every other Tribunal in
the place or places where the goods were shipped or
landed is incompetent, not withstanding that the ship
may be legally represented there.15
The district court granted the motion, “subject to the filing of a bond by
NAI in the sum of $100,000 to respond to whatever judgment might
finally be rendered.”16 The court of appeals reversed, finding the
provision in the bill of lading inapplicable to libels in rem and declining
to enforce its terms as to the libel in personam.17
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 opinion by Justice Brennan,
dismissed the certiorari as improvidently granted.18 The Court agreed
with the court of appeals and held that the clause above was
inapplicable to libels in rem, and, accordingly, the libel in rem was
properly maintainable.19 As for the action in personam presumably
covered by the clause, the Supreme Court did not pass on it because the
parties could nevertheless bring an action in rem in Texas.20 The
Supreme Court, in other words, chose not to decide the extent to which
effect can be given, in general, to stipulations in ocean bills of lading

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Carbon Black, 359 U.S. at 181.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 182.
Id. at 181.
Id.
Id. at 183-84.
Id. at 182-83.
Id. at 184.
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not to resort to the courts of the U.S.21 Justice Harlan in his dissent
criticized the Court for refusing to decide this general point:
“Avoidance of decision now on a question which is obviously bound to
recur seems to me to be both unsatisfactory and unsound judicial
administration.”22
While Carbon Black did not decide the question whether a FSC
that deprives an American court of jurisdiction is enforceable, the
interpretation that the Court gave to the clause in question (i.e., that it
applied only to actions in rem while it could have been construed as
applicable to both in personam and in rem claims) indicated the Court’s
disfavor with FSCs. Subsequent decisions seem to consider Carbon
Black a precedent23 and indeed the Supreme Court in Bremen seems to
refer to its Carbon Black decision as a precedent.24
Also the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts (1971) adopted the
traditional approach. Section 80 (Limitations Imposed by Contract of
Parties) states:
The parties’ agreement as to the place of the action
cannot oust a state of judicial jurisdiction, but such an
agreement will be given effect unless it is unfair or
unreasonable.25
In conclusion, even if the Supreme Court had never passed
directly on the standards for enforceability of FSCs before Bremen, the
prevailing view was that a FSC that deprived an American court of
jurisdiction was unenforceable as such because it was contrary to the
public policy that ousting jurisdiction was impermissible.
If a FSC could not be interpreted as ousting an American court of
jurisdiction, what was the value of such a clause before Bremen? The
comment to §80 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts, 1971 states:

21
Id. at 184 (“Resolution here of the extent to which these bill of lading
provisions may be given effect by our courts can await a day when the issue is
posed less abstractly.”).
22
Id. at 185-86.
23
See, e.g., In re Unterweser Reederei, Gmbh. 428 F.2d 888, 893 n.26
(5th Cir. 1970) (referring to Carbon Black as precedent); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v.
N.V. Stoomvart-Maatschappij ‘Oostzee’, 201 F.Supp. 76 (E.D. La. 1961).
24
Bremen, 407 U.S. at 19 (referring to its decision in Carbon Black, the
Supreme Court noted: “[T]he absolute aspects of the doctrine of the Carbon
Black case have little place and would be a heavy hand indeed on future
development of international commercial dealings by Americans.”).
25
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS §80 (1971).
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a. Rationale. Private individuals have no power to
alter the rules of judicial jurisdiction. They may not
by their contract oust a state of any jurisdiction it
would otherwise possess. This does not mean that no
weight should be accorded a provision in a contract
that any action thereon shall be brought only in a
particular state. Such a provision represents an
attempt by the parties to insure that the action will be
brought in a forum that is convenient for them. A
court will naturally be reluctant to entertain an action
if it considers itself to be an inappropriate forum. And
the fact that the action is brought in a state other
than that designated in the contract affords ground
for holding that the forum is an inappropriate one
and that the court in its discretion should refuse to
entertain this action. Such a provision, however, will
be disregarded if it is the result of overreaching or of
the unfair use of unequal bargaining power or if the
forum chosen by the parties would be a seriously
inconvenient one for the trial of the particular action.
On the other hand, the provision will be given effect,
and the action dismissed, if to do so would be fair
and reasonable. (emphasis added)26

B. BREMEN V. ZAPATA OFF-SHORE CO. AND CARNIVAL CRUISE
LINES, INC. V. SHUTE
Even before Bremen, the lower federal courts were showing an
increasing willingness to enforce FSCs. 27 The traditional approach was
clearly overturned in 1972 when the Supreme Court decided Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Company.28

26

Id. §80, cmt. a (1971).
See Wm. H. Muller & Co. v. Swed. Am. Line Ltd., 224 F.2d 806 (2d
Cir. 1955) (holding that enforcement of a clause in a bill of lading providing
that all controversies arising thereunder would be under jurisdiction of court of
carrier’s country, if not unreasonable, is not in contravention of public policy);
Geiger v. Keilani, 270 F.Supp. 761 (E.D. Mich. 1967) (holding that exclusive
FSC is not per se invalid but may be sustained if in light of surrounding
circumstances it is reasonable); Aetna Ins. Co. v. The Satrustegui, 171 F. Supp.
33 (D. P.R. 1959) (holding that parties to a contract may provide that all actions
for breach shall be brought only in a certain court).
28
Bremen, 407 U.S. 1.
27
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Unterweser, a German corporation, entered into an agreement
with Zapata, an American corporation, to tow Zapata’s drilling rig
“Chaparral” from Louisiana to Italy, where Zapata had agreed to
extract oil. The contract between Zapata and Unterweser contained the
following FSC: “Any dispute arising must be treated before the London
Court of Justice.”29 The contract contained also two exculpatory
clauses for the benefit of Unterweser. While in international waters off
the Gulf of Mexico, a storm surprised the flotilla and damaged the rig.
Zapata asked Unterweser to transport the rig to Tampa. Zapata then
sued “in admiralty in the United States District Court at Tampa,
seeking $3,500,000 damages against Unterweser in personam and the
[ship] Bremen in rem, alleging negligent towage and breach of
contract.”30 Unterweser moved to dismiss the action or in the
alternative to stay the action pending decision of a London court in
front of which they had in the meantime brought suit for breach of
contract.
The district court—relying on Carbon Black31—denied
Unterweser’s motion to dismiss or stay Zapata’s action. 32 The district
court treated the motion as a motion for forum non conveniens and held
that Unterweser had not satisfied its burden of proof to show that the
balance of convenience was strongly in its favor.33 The court of
appeals, also relying on Carbon Black, affirmed.34
The Supreme Court held that in a freely negotiated agreement,
FSCs “are prima facie valid and should be enforced unless enforcement
is shown by the resisting party to be ‘unreasonable’ under the
circumstances.”35 This is the principle followed in England and other
common law countries.36 As to this particular agreement, the Court
held:
The choice of that forum was made in an arm’slength negotiation by experienced and sophisticated
businessmen, and absent some compelling and
countervailing reason it should be honored by the

29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

Id. at 2.
Id. at 3-4.
Carbon Black, 359 U.S. 180.
Bremen, 407 U.S. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
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parties and enforced by the courts. 37
The Court stated that there were compelling reasons in support of its
decision:
There are compelling reasons why a freely negotiated
private international agreement, unaffected by fraud,
undue influence, or overweening bargaining power as
that involved here, should be given full effect. 38
The compelling reasons that the Court discussed are above all
economic: the traditional disfavor towards FSC was—among other
things—a hindrance to the international trade of American business. In
addition, the Court expressed further reasons that were specific to the
contract before it: (1) the fact that the contract was “a far from routine
transaction between companies of two different nations contemplating
the tow of an extremely costly piece of equipment” through the waters
of many jurisdictions;39 (2) the fact that “the accident occurred in the
Gulf of Mexico and the barge was towed to Tampa . . . were mere
fortuities”;40 (3) the fact that the English forum was a neutral one and
was chosen to eliminate uncertainty of forum since an accident could
have happened anywhere;41 (4) the fact that the forum selection was
negotiated between the parties and must have been taken into account
in the acceptance of the economic terms. 42
The Court rejected the claim that Unterweser had to establish that
London was a more convenient forum than Tampa. 43 Rather the right
approach, according to the court, was:
[T]o enforce the forum clause specifically unless Zapata could
clearly show that enforcement would be unreasonable and
unjust, or that the clause was invalid for such reasons as fraud
or overreaching.44

37

Id. at 12.
Id. at 12-13.
39
Id. at 13.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 14. (“There is strong evidence that the forum clause was a vital
part of the agreement and it would be unrealistic to think that the parties did not
conduct their negotiations, including fixing the monetary terms, with the
consequences of the forum clause figuring prominently in their calculations.”).
43
Id.
44
Id. at 15.
Whatever “inconvenience” Zapata would suffer by being forced to
38
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Bremen does not stand for the proposition that FSCs should be
absolutely enforceable between sophisticated entities. The Court in
fact places two limits to the enforcement of FSCs: (1)
unreasonableness45 and (2) public policy.46
As for unreasonableness, the Court does not clarify when a FSC
would be unreasonable (this is one of the unanswered issues that we
will consider below). Without giving a comprehensive definition of
unreasonableness, the Court specifies that (1) unreasonableness is very
difficult to be found in an international private agreement entered into
after “arm’s-length negotiations by experienced and sophisticated
businessmen”;47 and (2) in an international agreement, inconvenience
(even very serious inconvenience) to one party is not enough. 48 When
the agreement on a remote foreign forum is between two Americans for
an essentially local dispute, “the serious inconvenience of the
contractual forum to one or both of the parties might carry greater
weight in determining the reasonableness of the forum clause.”49
The uncertainty of the reasonableness standard is further
demonstrated by the following quote:
Of course, where it can be said with reasonable
assurance that at the time they entered the contract,
the parties to a freely negotiated private international
commercial agreement contemplated the claimed
inconvenience, it is difficult to see why any such
claim of inconvenience should be heard to render the
forum clause unenforceable.50

litigate in the contractual forum as it agreed to do was clearly foreseeable
at the time of contracting. In such circumstances it should be incumbent
on the party seeking to escape his contract to show that trial in the
contractual forum will be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that he will
for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in court. Absent that,
there is no basis for concluding that it would be unfair, unjust, or
unreasonable to hold that party to his bargain. Id. at 17-18.
45
Id. at 17.
46
Id. at 15.
47
Id. at 10.
48
Id. at 16-17.
49
Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
50
Id. at 16-17.
[Between two Americans,] [t]he remoteness of the forum
might suggest that the agreement was an adhesive one, or
that the parties did not have the particular controversy in
mind when they made their agreement; yet even there the

212

SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS

[Vol. 8.2

Does it mean that even in a freely negotiated international
commercial contract one party would be allowed to prove that the
inconvenience was not contemplated by the parties at the time of the
contract? And what evidence would be sufficient to show the lack of
negotiation of the issue?
Coming to the prong of violation of public policy, the Court does
not explain this limitation in detail either. It only states that a FSC will
be “unenforceable if enforcement would contravene a strong public
policy of the forum in which suit is brought, whether declared by
statute or by judicial decision.”51
Determining when a FSC is unenforceable as contrary to public
policy is an open question. From Bremen two points are clear,
however: (1) The ousting of the jurisdiction of an American court does
not make a FSC unenforceable because of violation public policy. The
Court criticized exactly this “provincial attitude” followed in the past
by American courts that was based on a concern about unfairness of the
tribunals in other countries.52 Saying that a FSC ousts the jurisdiction
of the court is a vestige of the past that is incompatible with the modern
world.53 Indeed, the point is not so much whether the clause ousts a
U.S. court of jurisdiction (it certainly does); what matters is the
“expectation of the parties.”54 (2) In an entirely local controversy
between two Americans, a FSC that would have the effect of avoiding
the application of a mandatory law of particular strength would be
unenforceable.55
Nineteen years after Bremen, in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v

party claiming should bear a heavy burden of proof. Id. at
17.
51
Id. at 15.
52
Id. at 12.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
The Court rejected the argument that the FSC in the contract between
Zapata and Unterweser was unenforceable as having the result of allowing the
avoidance of Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955). Id. at 1517. According to the Court, Bisso was not applicable because it only applies to
domestic waters and not to international waters. Id. The Court suggested,
however, that had Bisso been applicable, the FSC might have been
unenforceable as contrary to public policy. Id. at 17. See William M.
Richman, Carnival Cruise Lines: Forum Selection Clauses in Adhesion
Contracts, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 977 (1992). See also infra note 93 (discussing
the Bisso doctrine).
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Shute,56 the Court expanded the enforceability of FSCs. While in
Bremen the Supreme Court upheld a FSC between two sophisticated
parties, in Carnival Cruise the Court sustained the forum choice in an
adhesion contract.57
Mr. and Ms. Shute, a couple resident in Washington State,
purchased through a travel agent a seven day cruise on the ship
“Tropicale” owned by Carnival Cruise. 58 After the Shutes “paid the
fare to the agent,” Carnival Cruise, in its headquarters in Miami,
Florida, “prepared the tickets” and sent them to the Shutes. 59 The
following language was printed on the face of each ticket: “SUBJECT
TO CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT ON LAST PAGES
IMPORTANT! PLEASE READ CONTRACT--ON LAST PAGES 1,
2, 3.”60 Page 1 contained the following conditions:
“TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF PASSAGE
CONTRACT TICKET”
....
3. (a)
The acceptance of this ticket by the person
or persons named hereon as passengers shall be
deemed to be an acceptance and agreement by each
of them of all of the terms and conditions of this
passage Contract Ticket.
....
8. It is agreed by and between the passenger and the
Carrier that all disputes and matters whatsoever
arising under, in connection with or incident to this
Contract shall be litigated, if at all, in and before a
Court located in the State of Florida, U.S.A., to the

56

Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
While FSCs in adhesion contracts are beyond the scope of this paper,
Carnival Cruise has relevance to some of the issues raised in this paper. In
particular, the decision clarified that the enforceability of a FSC does not
depend on negotiation and does not depend on the two parties being
sophisticated. The decision, as we will discuss below, however, introduces
additional possible limitations on FSCs, i.e., burdensomeness and unfairness.
See Richman, supra note 55.
58
Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 587.
59
Id.
60
Id.
57
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exclusion of the Courts of any other state or
country.61
The Shutes boarded in Los Angeles. 62 While the ship was in
international waters off the Mexican coast, Ms. Shute slipped on the
deck and received injuries.63 The Shutes brought an action in a
Washington Federal District Court against Carnival Cruise.64 Carnival
Cruise moved for a summary judgment based on the FSC or,
alternatively, on lack of personal jurisdiction.65 The court granted the
motion, holding that there was no personal jurisdiction over Carnival
Cruise.66 The court of appeals reversed, finding that (1) the contacts
between Carnival Cruise and the forum state (Washington) were
enough to establish personal jurisdiction over Carnival Cruise and that
(2) the FSC was unenforceable because “not freely bargained for”
under the test of Bremen.67
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals
had “erred in refusing to enforce” the FSC. 68 The Supreme Court
stated that the court of appeals had wrongly applied a requirement that
FSCs must be freely bargained for because the court ignored the
difference between the contract involved in Bremen and the contract
involved in Carnival Cruise.69
The Bremen concerned a “far from routine
transaction between companies of two different
nations contemplating the tow of an extremely costly
piece of equipment from Louisiana across the Gulf of
Mexico and the Atlantic Ocean, through the
Mediterranean Sea to its final destination in the
Adriatic Sea.” . . . These facts suggest that, even
apart from the evidence of negotiation regarding the
forum clause, it was entirely reasonable for the Court
in The Bremen to have expected Unterweser and
Zapata to have negotiated with care in selecting a
61

Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 587-88.
Id. at 585.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 589-92 (“Alternatively, the Court of Appeals ruled that the clause
should not be enforced because enforcement effectively would deprive
respondents of an opportunity to litigate their claim against petitioner.”).
68
Id. at 595.
69
Id. at 592.
62
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forum for the resolution of disputes arising from their
special towing contract.
In contrast, respondents’ passage contract was purely
routine and doubtless nearly identical to every
commercial passage contract issued by petitioner and
most other cruise lines…. In this context, it would be
entirely unreasonable for us to assume that
respondents-or any other cruise passenger-would
negotiate with petitioner the terms of a forumselection clause in an ordinary commercial cruise
ticket.70
In Carnival Cruise the Supreme Court clarified the test of
enforceability of FSCs: a FSC is enforceable if it is reasonable and
reasonableness can exist even if the contract has not been negotiated at
arm’s length between the parties.71 The Court gave several reasons for
allowing the use of a FSC in an adhesion contract of this type: (1) “a
cruise line has a special interest in limiting the fora in which it
potentially could be subject to suit” since its passengers come from so
many different jurisdictions;72 (2) a FSC avoids confusion about where
a lawsuit can be brought, thus “sparing litigants the time and expense of
pretrial motions to determine the correct forum and conserving judicial
resources that otherwise would be devoted to deciding those
motions;”73 and (3) the passengers are likely to “benefit” in the form of
reduced fares reflecting the savings that the cruise line enjoys by
limiting the fora in which it may be sued.” 74
The Court specified that the enforceability of a FSC in an
adhesion contract is “subject to judicial scrutiny for fundamental
fairness.”75 The test for fairness is whether the selected forum was
chosen in bad faith to discourage passengers from bringing legitimate
claims.76 In Carnival Cruise there was no evidence that the forum
(Florida) was chosen with that purpose.77 Carnival Cruise has:
[I]ts principal place of business in Florida, and many
of its cruises depart from and return to Florida ports.
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77

Id. at 592-93 (internal citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 594.
Id.
Id. at 595.
Id.
Id.
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Similarly, there is no evidence that petitioner
obtained respondents’ accession to the forum clause
by fraud or overreaching. Finally, respondents have
conceded that they were given notice of the forum
provision and, therefore, presumably retained the
option of rejecting the contract with impunity. 78
The Shutes failed to satisfy “a ‘heavy burden of proof’ . . . required to
set aside the clause on grounds of inconvenience.”79
While the limitations set forth in Carnival Cruise seem to provide
protection for consumers, some courts have narrowly construed these
limitations. For example, in Seung v. Regent Seven Seas Cruises,
Inc.,80 the Eleventh Circuit found reasonable a FSC that forced a U.S.
passenger injured while on a cruise on a French ship to go to Paris to
litigate her claim.81
C. UNSOLVED ISSUES AFTER BREMEN AND CARNIVAL CRUISE
While today in the U.S. FSCs are generally enforceable,82 this
78

Id.
Id. (quoting Bremen, 407 U.S. 1). The Supreme Court rejected the
ungrounded statement of the court of appeals “that the Shutes were physically
and financially” unable to pursue their claim in Florida. Id. at 594 (quoting
Abramson v. Brownstein 897 F.2d 389, 389 (9th Cir. 1990). The Court also
held that Florida was not a remote forum and therefore, even if the contract in
question was between two Americans, the FSC was not to be examined with
more concern. Id.
80
Seung v. Regent Seven Seas Cruises, Inc., 393 F. App’x 647 (11th Cir.
2010).
81
The language of the FSC stated:
For all cruises which do not include a port of the United
States, it is agreed by and between the passengers and
Owners that any and all disputes and matters whatsoever
arising out of or in connection with this Ticket/Contract shall
be litigated and determined, if at all, before a court of
competent jurisdiction in Paris, France.
Id. at 649. As a matter of fact, “[Ms.] Seung’s cruise departed from
Tahiti.” Id. The ship “was to travel only within French Polynesia.” Id. Indeed,
it never entered in American waters. It only travelled in waters of French
jurisdiction. Id. at 651.
82
See Walter H. Heiser, The Hague Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements: The Impact on Forum Non Conveniens, Transfer of Venue,
Removal, and Recognition of Judgments in United States Courts, 31 U. PA. J.
INT’L L. 1013 (2010):
The vast majority of courts in the United States will enforce a
choice of court agreement . . . unless the resisting party
79
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result often does not come without a great deal of litigation. Litigation
is increased by a number of important questions that Bremen and
Carnival Cruise left unanswered. This section discusses the important
questions that remain unclear.
1.

WHAT IS THE TEST FOR DETERMINING ENFORCEABILITY OF A FSCS?

Bremen and Carnival Cruise discuss a number of principles and
factors governing FSCs but the decisions fail to reduce these elements
to a clear test. Lower courts since these cases have tried to do so. A
typical statement is the following:
Mandatory
forum-selection
clauses
are
“presumptively valid and enforceable” absent a
“strong showing that enforcement would be unfair or
unreasonable under the circumstances . . . . A forumselection clause will be invalidated when: (1) its
formation was induced by fraud or overreaching; (2)
the plaintiff would be deprived of its day in court
because of inconvenience or unfairness; (3) the
chosen law would deprive the plaintiff of a remedy;
or (4) enforcement of the clause would contravene
public policy.”83
Is this statement an accurate summary of Bremen and Carnival Cruise?
Even if it is, this “test” is complex in application.
2.

WHEN ARE FSCS UNREASONABLE AND THEREFORE
UNENFORCEABLE?

While the fundamental test for enforceability of FSCs is
“reasonableness,” unfortunately the Supreme Court has been quite
frugal in the definition of this concept both in Bremen and in Carnival
Cruise. We do know that a party attacking a FSC on the ground of
unreasonableness bears a heavy burden of proof. 84 From Bremen, we
know that the Supreme Court favors FSCs: FSCs are prima facie
shows that enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust. . .
. A few states treat forum selection clauses less favorably.
Some impose additional prerequisites to enforcement, such as
that there be a rational basis for the party’s forum choice;
others flatly refuse to enforce forum selection clauses in
certain cases. Id. at 1014-15.
83
Slater v. Energy Serv. Group Int’l., Inc., 634 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir.
2011) (quoting Krenkel v. Kerzner Int’l Hotels Ltd., 579 F.3d 1279, 1281 (11th
Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
84
Bremen, 407 U.S. 1.
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enforceable, unless the resisting party shows that the enforcement
would be “unreasonable under the circumstances” 85 or “unreasonable
and unjust.”86
Both Bremen and Carnival Cruise cite a number of factors
showing that the FSC in those cases were reasonable, but the factors are
quite specific to the facts of those cases. From the two cases it appears
that the possibility of litigation in multiple jurisdictions is a strong
factor supporting the enforcement of a FSC. It also appears that the
inconvenience of the chosen forum will not make the choice
unreasonable, particularly if the inconvenience was contemplated by
the parties, unless the dispute was essentially local and the clause called
for resolution in a “remote alien forum”; even in this case the
inconvenience would only “carry greater weight” in the analysis of
reasonableness.87 In Carnival Cruise the Court referred to the
possibility that a FSC might be unreasonable if it effectively deprives a
party of his right to a day in court, but the Court found that concept
inapplicable on the facts of the case.88 It also seems clear that lack of
negotiation of a FSC is not determinative of whether the clause is
unreasonable,89 nor is the fact that the parties are not business people.90
3.

WHEN WOULD A FSC VIOLATE A STRONG PUBLIC POLICY OF THE
FORUM STATE?

In both Bremen and Carnival Cruise the Court stated that a FSC
is unenforceable if it violates a strong public policy of the forum state.

85

Id. at 10.
Id. at 15.
87
Id. at 17.
88
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 594-95 (1991).
89
Id. at 585, 593. In fact in Carnival Cruise the Court stated that it was
entirely unreasonable to assume passengers to negotiate over the conditions of
their tickets:
Whereas it was entirely reasonable for Bremen Court to
have expected the parties to have negotiated with care in
selecting a forum for the resolution of disputes arising from
their complicated international agreement, it would be
entirely unreasonable to assume that a cruise passenger
would or could negotiate the terms of a forum clause in a
routine commercial cruise ticket form. . . . . We do not
adopt the Court of Appeals’ determination that a
nonnegotiated forum selection clause in a form ticket
contract is never enforceable simply because it is not the
subject of bargaining. Id. at 585, 593.
90
Id. at 592-93.
86
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The Court also indicated that such a public policy can be reflected in
either statutes or court decisions. In both cases the Court rejected
public policy claims. In Bremen, the Court held that the Bisso91
doctrine might be such a strong public policy, but the doctrine was
inapplicable to the facts of the case because the doctrine only applies in
domestic waters.92 More generally the Court spoke of violation of
public policy when a totally local matter between two Americans calls
for litigation in a foreign tribunal, and this has the effect of avoiding the
application of an American law of particular strength. 93
In Carnival Cruise the Court rejected the claim that the FSC
contained in a passenger ticket violated 46 U.S.C. §183c, which
prohibits a vessel owner from inserting in a contract a provision that
deprives a claimant of trial by a “court of competent jurisdiction.” 94
The Court found that the provision in the case did not deprive the
plaintiffs of trial by a court of competent jurisdiction because it

91
Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955). According to
the Bisso doctrine, exculpatory clauses in towing contracts in American waters
are invalid as a matter of public policy, id. See also Dixilyn Drilling Corp. v.
Crescent Towing & Salvage Co., 372 U.S. 697 (1963) (per curiam) (following
Bisso and declining to subject its rule governing towage contracts in American
waters to indeterminate exceptions based on delicate analysis of the facts of
each case).
92
In the contract between Unterweser and Zapata there were two
exculpatory clauses. The Court did not decide the issue of enforceability for a
violation of Bisso, since the accident happened in international waters:
It is clear . . . . that whatever the proper scope of the policy expressed in
Bisso, it does not reach this case. Bisso rasted [sic] on considerations with
respect to the towage business strictly in American waters, and those
considerations are not controlling in an international commercial agreement.
Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15-16.
93
Had the contract been between two American companies with a FSC
pointing to a foreign tribunal, the Court might have found the FSC
unenforceable on public policy grounds:
We are not here dealing with an agreement between two
Americans to resolve their essentially local disputes in a remote
alien forum. . . . . [The] selection of a remote forum to apply
differing foreign law to an essentially American controversy
might contravene an important public policy of the forum. For
example, so long as Bisso governs American courts with respect
to the towage business in American waters, it would quite
arguably be improper to permit an American tower to avoid that
policy by providing a foreign forum for resolution of his disputes
with an American towee. Id. at 17.
94
Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 595-96.
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required that suit be brought in Florida.95
As anticipated, with regard to public policy, the only two points
that are clear from the cases are: (1) Ousting a court of jurisdiction is
not a strong public policy justifying invalidation of a FSC; and (2) Two
Americans cannot use a FSC to avoid the application of a strong public
policy law for their entirely local controversy.
4.

TO WHAT EXTENT IS A FSC SUBJECT TO SCRUTINY FOR FAIRNESS,
AND IF SO WHAT ARE THE STANDARDS FOR UNFAIRNESS?

In Carnival Cruise the Court made clear that a FSC in a form
passage contract is subject to scrutiny for fundamental fairness. 96 The
Court went on to state that a bad faith motive to deprive passengers
from pursuing legitimate claims would amount to unfairness, although
on the facts of the case the Court found no such motive. 97 The Court
also indicated that lack of notice of the FSC could be the basis of a
claim of unfairness, but on the facts of the case the Court found that the
plaintiffs had sufficient notice of the clause, a conclusion with which
the dissent took strong disagreement.98 It is unclear, however, whether
scrutiny for unfairness is limited to form passage contracts, or whether
it applies to all form consumer contracts, or whether it applies to all
form contracts (both consumer and commercial) because they are not
negotiated. In Bremen the Court referred in passing to fairness, but it
did not use the concept in the case.99 It could be inferred that fairness
analysis has no application in negotiated commercial contracts like the
one involved in Bremen, but the issue was not squarely presented to the
Court.
5.

IS A FSC SUBJECT TO SCRUTINY FOR OVERWHELMING BARGAINING
POWER?

In Bremen the Court referred to this possibility although on the
facts of the case there was no such discrepancy in bargaining power. 100
In Carnival Cruise there was a discrepancy in bargaining power and no
negotiation, but the Court found that to be insufficient to invalidate the
FSC in that case.101 It is possible that the Court meant by
”overwhelming bargaining power” the inability to walk away from the
95

Id. at 596.
Id. at 595.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 597-98.
99
Bremen 407 U.S. at 18-19.
100
Id. at 12.
101
Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 593.
96
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transaction; under that definition there was no overwhelming
bargaining power in Carnival Cruise, but if so there would be few
cases in which such a situation would exist.
6.

HOW IS A FSC TO BE INTERPRETED?

There are several unsolved issues on interpretation. Both Bremen
and Carnival Cruise were admiralty cases; as such they were governed
by federal law.
The first unsolved question is whether the holding of Bremen
should apply outside of admiralty cases. In particular, does Bremen
apply in diversity cases? The answer is probably affirmative. Even if
the Supreme Court has not expressly passed on the point, in Justice
Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp.,102 there
is a statement that the holding of Bremen should apply also in diversity
cases.103 Lower court decisions have held that enforcement of FSCs is
a matter of procedure rather than substance. 104 In Albemarle v.
AstraZeneca105 the Fourth Circuit stated: “[W]hen a court is analyzing
a forum selection clause, which changes the default venue rules
applicable to the agreement, that court will apply federal law and in
doing so, give effect to the parties’ agreement.” 106 As a result, under
Erie,107 also in diversity cases, federal law should apply to determine
the enforceability of FSCs.
However, even if we consider as settled that interpretation and
enforcement of FSCs are governed by federal law, there is a second
unsolved question on interpretation: What is the federal law on
interpretation of FSCs? The issue is important because a FSC can be
narrowly or broadly construed. If a FSC is construed as merely
102

Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 33 (1988).
Id. at 33 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Although our opinion in Bremen
involved a Federal District Court sitting in admiralty, its reasoning applies with
much force to federal courts sitting in diversity.” (internal citation omitted)).
104
Wong v. PartyGaming Ltd, 589 F.3d 821, 827 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting
that six circuits have held that “the enforceability of a forum selection clause
implicates federal procedure and should therefore be governed by federal law,”
and adopting that rule); Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci America, Inc., 858 F.2d
509, 513 (9th Cir. 1988).
105
Albemarle Corp. v. AstraZeneca U.K., Ltd., 628 F.3d 643 (4th Cir.
2010).
106
Id. at 650.
107
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). For non-American
readers: Erie is a fundamental legal doctrine of civil procedure mandating that a
federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction must apply state substantive law,
but federal procedural law.
103

222

SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS

[Vol. 8.2

“permissive,” it operates as a consent to jurisdiction and does not bar
the action elsewhere. The “consent to jurisdiction function” is not
without importance, of course. Consent is one of the safest grounds for
personal jurisdiction in the U.S. and, as far as we know, in many other
countries.108 Much litigation on personal jurisdiction can be avoided if
the parties consent to jurisdiction.
But obviously consent to
jurisdiction does not solve the problem of possible proliferation of
competent fora. Indeed, if a FSC is interpreted as merely permissive,
uncertainty remains because we do not know for sure where an action,
if any, will be brought. Only if a FSC is interpreted as “exclusive,”
uncertainty is avoided because FSCs act both as a consent to
jurisdiction and as a bar to litigation in any other forum.
American courts have found dispositive the particular language of
the clause and applied that language strictly: the courts do not go
beyond the four corners of the clause.109 There is obviously no
problem when parties make clear whether the clause is permissive or
108
Jurisdiction (“personal jurisdiction” in the US to distinguish it from
“subject matter jurisdiction”) is the ability of a court to hear a case and to
impose a binding decision on a person or legal entity. There are many grounds
for jurisdiction and every country has its own rules. In Europe the main ground
for jurisdiction is defendant’s domicile; in contract actions, place of
performance is an alternative basis for jurisdiction (see Part II of this paper).
American (personal) jurisdictional grounds are based on service of process (so
called “tag jurisdiction”) and “minimum contacts,” as stated for the first time in
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (holding, among other
things, that minimum contacts with the forum state can enable a court of that
state to exert personal jurisdiction over a party consistent with the Due Process
clause of the American Constitution). Obviously, the place in which a person
has domicile, the place of performance of a contract, and (even more) the
existence of minimum contacts, can trigger much litigation. Consent to
jurisdiction is a straightforward ground that can avoid this type of litigation.
Indeed, there is no doubt that consent is an accepted basis for personal
jurisdiction by American courts, both in the form of consent by agreement - and
FSC is a form of express consent - and implied consent. For express consent,
see Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878) (holding, among other things, that
personal jurisdiction is a defense; it must be raised and can be waived) and for
implied consent, see Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (recognizing
jurisdiction based on implied consent or waiver). There is also no doubt that a
similar principle applies in other countries. See, e.g., Legge 31 maggio 1995, n.
218 (It.) (Reform of the Italian System of International Private Law).
109
Albemarle, 628 F.3d at 650 (“When construing forum selection
clauses, federal courts have found dispositive the particular language of the
clause and whether it authorizes another forum as an alternative to the forum of
the litigation or whether it makes the designated forum exclusive.”) (emphasis
removed).
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exclusive. As always, however, a doctrine proves itself in dubious
cases, i.e., in cases in which parties have not clearly expressed whether
their FSC is permissive or exclusive. The Supreme Court has not
passed on the point. Lower federal courts decisions have considered a
FSC as permissive, absent specific language that makes the clause
exclusive.110 In federal courts, simply put, the rule seems to be that an
agreement conferring jurisdiction to one forum will not be interpreted
as excluding jurisdiction elsewhere unless it contains specific language
of exclusion.
In addition, traditionally a FSC has been treated separately from a
choice-of-law clause. In other words, the interpretation of the FSC was
based on the law of the forum, irrespective of the law that governed the
substance of the agreement. The result is that a FSC has been treated as
permissive even if it would be interpreted as exclusive under the law
that was chosen by the parties.
The permissive approach - likely a remnant of the time in which
exclusive FSCs were contrary to public policy as ousting the
jurisdiction of American courts—clearly “reintroduces the very
uncertainty that parties attempt to dispel by pre-selecting the law and
forum for future disputes.”111

II.

THE TREATMENT OF FSCS IN INTERNATIONAL TREATIES

In comparison to U.S. domestic law, the enforcement of FSCs by
international documents is quite liberal. We refer to the so called
“Brussels Regime”112 and to the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of
Court Agreements.113 The 1958 New York Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York

110

See e.g. IntraComm, Inc. v. Bajaj, 492 F.3d 285 (4th Cir. 2007)
(holding that clause providing that either party “shall be free” to pursue its
rights in a specified court did not preclude jurisdiction or venue in the forum
court). Id. at 290. See also John Boutari & Son, Wines and Spirits, S.A. v.
Attiki Importers, Inc., 22 F.3d 51, 52-53 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that the clause
“[a]ny dispute arising between the parties hereunder shall come within the
jurisdiction of the competent Greek Courts, specifically of the Thessaloniki
Courts,” was not an exclusive forum-selection).
111
J. Zachary Courson, Yavuz v. 61 Mm, Ltd.: A New Federal Standard -Applying Contracting Parties’ Choice of Law to the Analysis of Forum
Selection Agreements, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 597, 597 (2008).
112
See infra note 120.
113
Hague Convention, supra note 6.
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Arbitration Convention”)114 is also an example of a liberal approach
with reference to arbitration (which is, after all, nothing but a FSC in
which the “judge” is private). We will discuss the New York
Arbitration Convention in Part III of this paper.
A. THE BRUSSELS REGIME
The Brussels Regime is the system of rules that govern
jurisdiction among the European countries in civil and commercial
disputes between individuals and entities resident in member states of
the European Union (“E.U.”) and of the European Free Trade
Association (“EFTA”).115 Based on the traditional European approach
on jurisdictional matters, the focus of rules of the Brussels Regime is
on a defendant’s domicile.
The Brussels Regime consists of three documents: the
Convention of September 27, 1968, on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (“Brussels
Convention”),116 the Convention of September 16, 1988, on
Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, as revised by the Convention signed on October 30, 2007
114
See The New York Convention – Authentic Texts and Translations,
NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION (last visited May 7, 2011),
http://www.newyorkconvention.org/new-york-convention/new-york-conventio
n-texts, for the authentic texts of the New York Arbitration Convention.
115
While it is unnecessary to explain what the EU is, for non-European
readers EFTA is an intergovernmental organization set up for the promotion of
free trade and economic integration to the benefit of its four Member States
(Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland). EFTA manages the
Agreement on the European Economic Area (“EEA Agreement”). The EEA
Agreement—entered into force on January 1, 1994—brings together the 27 EU
Members and three of the four EFTA countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, and
Norway) in a single internal market. Switzerland is not part of the EEA
Agreement, but has a bilateral agreement with the EU. See generally THE EUR.
FREE TRADE ASS’N, http://www.efta.int (last visited Feb. 6, 2011), for further
information.
116
Also called “EEX”, it was agreed between the countries of EU at the
time. The countries that are bound by the Brussels Convention are: Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Norway, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, United Kingdom,
Gibraltar, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland (updated 2007). For the text of the
Brussels Convention see Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 1968, LEX
MERCATORIA, http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/brussels.jurisdiction.and.enforcement.
of.judgments.in.civil.and.commercial.matters.convention.1968/doc.html (last
visited April 8, 2011).
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(“Lugano Convention”),117 and the EC/Council Regulation No. 44/2001
of December 22, 2000 on Jurisdiction and Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (“Brussels
I Regulation”).118
The rules of the three documents are very similar (that is why we
simply speak of “Brussels Regime”) but not identical because while
the Brussels Convention and the Brussels I Regulation are subject to
the interpretation of the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”),119 the
Lugano Convention is not.120
117

Also called “EVEX”, it was agreed between EU and the countries of
EFTA (except Lichtenstein). It has been practically replaced by the so called
“revised Lugano Convention” signed on October 30, 2007, between the EU,
Denmark, and the countries of EFTA (except Lichtenstein) with the purpose of
making uniform the rules of the Lugano Convention and the EC/Council
Regulation N.44/2001. The 1988 Lugano Convention still applies when
dealing with Iceland, since in that country the Lugano Convention 2007 has not
yet entered into force. For the text of the revised Lugano Convention 2007, see
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters – Protocol 1 on Certain Questions of
Jurisdiction, Procedure and Enforcement – Protocol 2 on the Uniform
Interpretation of the Convention and on the Standing Committee, EUR-LEX,
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:22007A1221
%2803%29:EN:NOT (last visited Apr. 8, 2011). For more information about
the revised Lugano Convention 2007, see Lugano Convention 2007, FEDERAL
OFFICE OF JUSTICE, http://www.bj.admin.ch/content/bj/en/home/themen/
wirtschaft/ internationales_privatrecht/lugue2007.html (last visited Apr. 8,
2011).
118
Council Regulation 44/2001, On Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 12)
1, pmbl. [hereinafter “Brussels I Regulation”]. The text of Brussels I
Regulation is available online. See Convention on Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
EUR-LEX (Feb. 6, 2012, 9:55 PM), http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32001R0044:EN:NOT.
119
To show how significant the interpretation by the ECJ of the Brussels I
Regulation and the Brussels Regulation can be see, e.g., Case C-386/05, Color
Drack GmbH v. Lexx Int’l Vertriebs GmbH, 2007 E.C.R. I-5463 (deciding the
meaning of “place of performance of the contractual obligation” under Article
5(1)(b)), and Case C-539/03 Roche Nederland V & Others v. Frederick Primus
& Milton Goldenberg, 2006 E.C.R. I-6535 (holding that in an action against a
plurality of defendants for infringement of a European patent committed in a
number of Contracting States, jurisdiction lies in the courts of the place where
one of the defendants is domiciled.).
120
With regard to the Lugano Convention decisions of the ECJ are only
persuasive.
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The Brussels I Regulation binds the E.U. members and applies
inside the boundary of those countries. 121 The Brussels I Regulation
also applies to some of the territories of member states located outside
of Europe122 and generally to countries for whose external relations
some of the E.U. members are responsible.123 The Brussels Convention
and the Lugano Convention apply when a defendant is domiciled in one
of the contracting parties (or in their territories). 124 But since many of
the Brussels Convention’s contracting parties are now also E.U.
members, the Brussels I Regulation has largely, if not totally
superseded the Brussels Convention.
The purpose of the entire Brussels Regime is to obtain
predictability in jurisdiction and to avoid the proliferation of alternative
fora. The Brussels I Regulation states:
The rules of jurisdiction must be highly predictable
and founded on the principle that jurisdiction is
generally based on the defendant’s domicile and
jurisdiction must always be available on this ground
save in a few well-defined situations in which the
subject-matter of the litigation or the autonomy of the
parties warrants a different linking factor. The
domicile of a legal person must be defined
autonomously so as to make the common rules more
transparent and avoid conflicts of jurisdiction. 125
The basic rule on jurisdiction is contained in Article 2 of each of
the three documents. Each Article 2 provides that a person (and the
term includes entities), independently from his or her nationality, may
only be sued in the state in which the person is domiciled. In a
contractual matter, the person can also be sued where the contractual
obligation must be performed.126

121

There are exceptions. For example, while Greek Cyprus is subject to
the Brussels I Regulation, the non Greek Cyprus is not.
122
For a detailed explanation of the application of the Brussels I
Regulation, see BRUSSELS I REGULATION 24-30 (Ulrich Magnus & Peter
Mankowski eds., 2007).
123
There are exceptions. See id.
124
Not all contracting parties have agreed to apply the Convention to their
entire territory. For example, while Denmark is bound by the Brussels
Convention, its territories of Greenland and Faroe Islands are not.
125
Brussels I Regulation, supra note 118, pmbl.
126
See, e.g., id. art. 5.
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Notwithstanding the importance of the concept of “domicile” in
the Brussels Regime, none of the three documents gives a definition of
this concept.127 The three documents, in a similar manner, simply refer
to the internal laws of the several states (see Article 59 for the Brussels
I Regulation, Article 52 for the Brussels Convention, and Article 59 for
the Lugano Convention). For example Article 59 of the Brussels I
Regulation provides:
1. In order to determine whether a party is domiciled
in the Member State whose courts are seised of a
matter, the court shall apply its internal law.
2. If a party is not domiciled in the Member State
whose courts are seised of the matter, then, in order
to determine whether the party is domiciled in
another Member State, the court shall apply the law
of that Member State.128
The Brussels Regime, however, defines “domicile” for companies.
See, for example, Article 60 of the Brussels I Regulation that provides:
1. For the purposes of this Regulation, a company or
other legal person or association of natural or legal
persons is domiciled at the place where it has its:
(a) statutory seat, or
(b) central administration, or
(c) principal place of business.129
127

See generally The Brussels I Regulation, BRECHT’S DUTCH CIVIL LAW
(Apr. 8, 2011), available at http://www.dutchcivillaw.com/content/
brusselsone011.htm (explaining that the regulation is based on domicile and not
residence). Contrary to various International Conventions, particularly those
drawn up within the framework of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law, and contrary to Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 concerning
jurisdiction and the recognition and the enforcement of judgments in
matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility (‘the Brussels II
Regulation’), the Brussels I Regulation does not link the question of
jurisdiction to the habitual residence of the defendant (or plaintiff), but solely to
his domicile.
128
Brussels I Regulation, supra note 118, art. 59.
129
Id. art. 60. Article 60 of the revised Lugano Convention 2007 is
identical, while Article 52 of the Brussels Convention is partially different
(“For the purposes of this Convention, the seat of a company or other legal
person or association of natural or legal persons shall be treated as its domicile.
However in order to determine that seat, the court shall apply its rules of
private international law.”). Id.
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The definition does not solve entirely the problem, however, because
“statutory seat” is not defined.130
The Brussels Regime covers only legal disputes of a civil or
commercial nature.131
Disputes of family law, bankruptcy or
insolvency, social security, or disputes related to arbitration are
expressly excluded.132
The Brussels Regime is liberal on the enforcement of FSCs.
Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation provides:
If the parties, one or more of whom is domiciled in a
Member State, have agreed that a court or the courts
of a Member State are to have jurisdiction to settle
any disputes which have arisen or which may arise in
connection with a particular legal relationship, that
court or those courts shall have jurisdiction.133
Under the Brussels Regime, FSCs are interpreted as “exclusive,”
not as “permissive”.134 Article 23 specifies that “Such jurisdiction shall
be exclusive unless the parties have agreed otherwise.” 135 As one
author has argued:
An agreement which complies with the requirements
of Article 23 shall create exclusive jurisdiction unless
the agreement provides otherwise. The European
Court of Justice has persisted to view the forum
130

The Brussels I Regulation, BRECHT’S DUTCH CIVIL LAW,
http://www.dutchcivillaw.com/content/brusselsone011.htm (last visited May 6,
2011). (“[The Brussels I Regulation] . . . . does not define what is meant by the
seat of a legal person or of a company or association of natural or legal persons.
In determining the location of the seat, the seised court has to apply its own
rules of private international law. Therefore, article 60 refers to domestic rules
of private international law with regard to the statutory seat of legal persons of
the State of the court hearing the case. This may cause difficulties, because it’s
possible that the statutory seat, according to domestic private international law,
is not located in any Member State or not in a State where the legal person
maintains property or has its head office. For this reason, two alternatives have
been added: the place of the legal person’s central management or, as another
option, the principal place of its business, so that a legal person may be linked
as well to a Member State on the basis of factual elements.”). Id.
131
Brussels I Regulation, supra note 118, art. 1.
132
Id.
133
Brussels I Regulation, supra note 118, art. 23.
134
Id.
135
Id.
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selection clause, which was subject to consensus
between the parties and which is included in an
agreement in writing, as truly consensual and
therefore enforceable and valid.136
FSCs under the Brussels Regime must be in writing “or
evidenced in writing,” or according to the course of dealing between
the parties or “in international trade or commerce, in a form which
accords with a usage of which the parties are or ought to have been
aware and which in such trade or commerce is widely known to, and
regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved in the
particular trade or commerce concerned.”137
If the defendant is not domiciled in one of the E.U. countries (or
in Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland), or if the dispute is one of those
that are excluded, then the Brussels Regime does not apply; instead, the
domestic conflict of laws rules of the several European states apply. 138
The domestic laws of many of the European countries, however, have
also a very liberal attitude towards FSC.139
B. THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS
The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (“Hague
Convention”)140 was concluded on June 30, 2005, under the Hague

136

Igor Volner, Forum Selection Clauses: Different Regulations from the
Perspective of Cruise Ship Passengers, 8 EUR. J.L. REFORM 439, 462 (2006)
(Neth.), available at http://folk.uio.no/erikro/WWW/corrgr/Volner_prot.pdf.
137
Brussels I Regulation, supra note 118, art. 23.
138
Id. art. 4 (“If the defendant is not domiciled in a Member State, the
jurisdiction of the courts of each Member State shall, subject to Articles 22
and 23, be determined by the law of that Member State.”).
139
E.g., Legge 31 maggio 1995, n. 218 (It.) (“Consent and waiver of
jurisdiction. 1. When there is no [Italian] jurisdiction, the latter also exists if
the parties have consented to it through an agreement and the consent is proved
in writing, or the defendant appears in the proceeding without objecting to the
lack of jurisdiction in his first pleading. 2. The Italian jurisdiction can be
waived by agreement for a foreign court or a foreign arbitrator if the waiver is
proved in writing and the lawsuit concerns a waivable right. 3. The waiver is
ineffective if the foreign judge or foreign arbitrators that have been indicated
(by the parties) refuse the jurisdiction or anyway cannot decide the lawsuit.”
(unofficial translation made by authors)).
140
Hague Convention, supra note 6. For a clear explanation of the Hague
Convention, see Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, EUROPA,
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/judicial_coop
eration_in_civil_matters/jl0026_en.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2011).
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Conference on Private International Law. 141 It is an open convention,
i.e. “is open for signature by all States.” (Article 27(1)).142
Because of its importance, the Hague Convention has been
characterized as “the counterpart for litigation of the New York
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards.”143 Mexico accessed to the Convention on September 26,
2007.144 On January 19, 2009, the United States became the first
country to sign the Convention after Mexico’s accession; the European
Union signed on April 1, 2009.145 Even if the Convention is not yet in
force,146 the signature by the U.S. and the E.U. obviously demonstrates
approval of its principles.147

141

The Hague Conference on Private International Law is an international
intergovernmental organization that has the purpose to work for the progressive
unification of the rules of private international law in the participating
countries. The Convention has 72 members. For a list of members, see
Members, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012),
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=states.listing. The United States has
been a member since October 15 1964, while the European Union accessed the
Conference in October 2006 (but many of the EU countries were already
members since the fifties and sixties).
142
Hague Convention, supra note 6, art. 27.
143
James Spigelman, The Hague Choice of Court Convention and
International Commercial Litigation, 9 JUD. REV. 389 (2010) (N.S.W.) (Austl.).
144
See Status Table, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2010), http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid
=98#legend.
145
Id.
146
According to Article 31, the Hague Convention is effective once two
countries consent. Indeed the Hague Convention will enter into force “on the
first day of the month following the expiration of three months after the deposit
of the second instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession
referred to in Article 27.” See Hague Convention, supra note 6, art. 31, para. 1.
Under Article 27 a country may sign the Convention, but the Convention is
subject to ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession by the signatory
states. Id. art. 27, para. 2. Since Mexico is the only country to have ratified the
Hague Convention, the Convention has not gone into force.
147
The signature is very significant because, as it has been accurately
noted, “[C]ourts, unlike commercial arbitrators, are regarded as manifestations
of national sovereignty which governments are reluctant to compromise, even
in the promotion of economic growth.” Spigelman, supra note 143, at 2. The
signature demonstrates a change in this attitude.
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The aim of the Hague Convention is to make “choice of court
agreements as effective as possible.” 148 As the Chief Justice of New
South Wales of Australia has said:
Ratification of the Hague Choice of Court
Convention can make a contribution to reducing the
transaction costs and uncertainties associated with the
enforcement of legal rights and obligations in
international trade and investment.”149
The Hague Convention governs the recognition and enforcement
of judgments in international disputes arising from commercial
transactions to which exclusive choice-of-court agreements apply.150
Even if this might sound restrictive, we should consider that the
definition of “international” under the Hague Convention is quite wide:
A case is “international” unless the parties are resident in the same
contracting state and “the relationship of the parties and all other
elements relevant to the dispute, regardless of the location of the
chosen court, are connected only with that State.” 151 A case is also
“international” when a party seeks the recognition or enforcement of a
foreign judgment.152 In addition, the Hague Convention, like the

148

Trevor Hartley &Masato Dogauchi, Explanatory Report, HAGUE
CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW at 21, para. 1 (2005)
[hereinafter Explanatory Report], http://www.hcch.net/upload/expl37e.pdf.
(“1. The aim. If the Convention is to attain its aim of making choice of court
agreements as effective as possible, it has to ensure three things. Firstly, the
chosen court must hear the case when proceedings are brought before it;
secondly, any other court before which proceedings are brought must refuse to
hear them; and thirdly, the judgment of the chosen court must be recognized
and enforced. These three obligations have been incorporated into the
Convention, where they constitute its key provisions. The hope is that the
Convention will do for choice of court agreements what the New York
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of
10 June 1958 has done for arbitration agreements.”).
149
See Spigelman, supra note 143, at 6.
150
Hague Convention, supra note 6, art. 1, pmbl.
151
Id. art. 1.
152
Id. art. 1 (“(1) This Convention shall apply in international cases to
exclusive choice of court agreements concluded in civil or commercial matters.
(2) For the purposes of Chapter II, a case is international unless the parties are
resident in the same Contracting State and the relationship of the parties and all
other elements relevant to the dispute, regardless of the location of the chosen
court, are connected only with that State. (3) For the purposes of Chapter III, a
case is international where recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment is
sought.”).
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Brussels Regime, considers an agreement as “exclusive,” unless the
parties clearly specified otherwise. 153
Article 3 Exclusive choice of court agreements
(b) a choice of court agreement which designates the
courts of one Contracting State or one or more
specific courts of one Contracting State shall be
deemed to be exclusive unless the parties have
expressly provided otherwise; 154
The Hague Convention does not apply to consumer contracts and
employment contracts.155 Further, the Hague Convention does not
apply in many cases including, legal capacity of natural persons,
maintenance obligations or other family issues, transportation contracts
(both passengers and goods), insolvency, rights in rem in immovable
property, and tenancies of immovable property, anti-trust, validity of
legal persons and of decision of their organs, validity of intellectual
property rights.156
The requirements for the validity of choice of court agreements
are substantially the same as in the Brussels Regime: the agreement
must be in writing or capable to be accessible for future reference.157
The Hague Convention adopts the severability doctrine, 158 i.e., a
FSC is like a separate contract inside the contract.
Article 3 (Exclusive choice of court agreements)
...
(d) an exclusive choice of court agreement that forms
part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement
independent of the other terms of the contract. The
validity of the exclusive choice of court agreement

153

Id. art. 3.
Id.
155
Id. art. 2.
156
Id. art. 2 (“Exclusions from scope.”).
157
Id. art. 3 (“Exclusive choice of court agreements . . . . For the purposes
of this Convention an exclusive choice of court agreement must be concluded
or documented i) in writing; or ii) by any other means of communication which
renders information accessible so as to be usable for subsequent reference.”).
158
See infra pt. III for severability.
154
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cannot be contested solely on the ground that the
contract is not valid.159
In analyzing the significance of the Hague Convention, Articles 5
and 6 are particularly important. Article 5 governs the jurisdiction of
the chosen court.160 The chosen court cannot refuse to decide “a
dispute to which the agreement applies, unless the agreement is null
and void under the law of that State.”161 The court “shall not decline to
exercise jurisdiction on the ground that the dispute should be decided in
a court of another State.”162 These provisions make clear that, save a
contracting state’s reservation under Article 19,163 there is no legitimate
possibility for a designated court of a contracting state to invoke a
closed-door statute164 to refuse to hear a case, and there is no space for
a forum non conveniens analysis.
In addition, the enforcement of a judgment rendered by the court
designated in a FSC is quite easy under the Hague Convention. In fact,
under Article 20 the grounds for nonenforcement of a judgment by the
chosen court are limited.165

159

Hague Convention, supra note 6, art. 3.
Id. art. 5.
161
Id.
162
Id. (“Jurisdiction of the chosen court . . . . (1) The court or courts of a
Contracting State designated in an exclusive choice of court agreement shall
have jurisdiction to decide a dispute to which the agreement applies, unless
the agreement is null and void under the law of that State. (2) A court that has
jurisdiction under paragraph 1 shall not decline to exercise jurisdiction on the
ground that the dispute should be decided in a court of another State. (3) The
preceding paragraphs shall not affect rules - (a) on jurisdiction related to
subject matter or to the value of the claim; (b) on the internal allocation of
jurisdiction among the courts of a Contracting State. However, where the
chosen court has discretion as to whether to transfer a case, due consideration
should be given to the choice of the parties.”)
163
Id. art. 19 (“Declarations limiting jurisdiction . . . . A State may
declare that its courts may refuse to determine disputes to which an exclusive
choice of court agreement applies if, except for the location of the chosen court,
there is no connection between that State and the parties or the dispute.”).
164
A closed-door statute is a statute that bars foreigners (or, in various
ways depending on the statute, foreigners that have no connection with the
state) the access to local courts.
165
Hague Convention, supra note 6, art. 20. There is, however, the
possibility for a contracting state to make a reservation. (“Declarations limiting
recognition and enforcement . . . . A State may declare that its courts may
refuse to recognise or enforce a judgment given by a court of another
Contracting State if the parties were resident in the requested State, and the
160
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Article 6 governs the situation of every other court of contracting
states different from the chosen court.166 It provides that, when the
Convention is applicable, every court of a contracting state different
from the chosen court “shall suspend or dismiss proceedings to which
an exclusive choice of court agreement applies.”167 Article 6, however,
carves out some significant exceptions. A nonchosen court does not
have to “suspend or dismiss proceedings” if (a) the FSC is “null and
void” according to the “law of the State of the chosen court”; or (b) “a
party lacked the capacity to conclude the agreement” under the forum
law; or (c) “giving effect to the agreement would lead to a manifest
injustice or would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the
State of the court seised”; or (d) for exceptional reasons beyond the
control of the parties, the agreement cannot reasonably be performed;
or (e) the chosen court has decided not to hear the case.168 Article 6
therefore allows the persistence of elements of uncertainty connected to
the law of the forum state. In particular, much uncertainty is triggered
by the “injustice” and “public policy” exceptions of letter (c). 169 This
provision allows for a wide leeway of the nonchosen court. The
Explanatory Report170 to the Convention does not provide any
guidance:
under paragraph (c), . . . [the non-seised court]
applies its own concepts of “manifest injustice” and
“public policy”. In this respect, the Convention
differs from the 1958 New York Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, which does not specify the law applicable in
these circumstances.171
The Explanatory Report adds that the standards for “’manifestly
contrary to the public policy’” and “injustice” require a “high
threshold,”172 but the Report does not provide more guidance.

relationship of the parties and all other elements relevant to the dispute, other
than the location of the chosen court, were connected only with the requested
State.”). Id.
166
Id. art. 6 (“Obligations of a court not chosen”).
167
Id. art. 6.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
See Hague Convention, supra note 6.
171
Explanatory Report, supra note 148, at 21, para. 4.
172
Id. at 48, para. 153 (“The phrase ‘manifestly contrary to the public
policy of the State of the court seised’ is intended to set a high threshold. It
refers to basic norms or principles of that State; it does not permit the court
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The application of exception (d) is also quite uncertain.173 We do
not know what are these “exceptional reasons beyond the control of the
parties” for which the FSC “cannot reasonably be performed.”174 The
Explanatory Report explains this exception with some more details and
gives examples, but the language itself is so wide that no strict
boundary can be fixed. In addition, the Explanatory Report specifies
that “it need not be absolutely impossible, but the situation must be
exceptional.”175
The Hague Convention applies only between contracting parties,
i.e. when the parties to a contract have chosen a court of one of the
contracting states to decide a dispute and enforcement of the clause or
the judgment takes place in another contracting state. 176 Article 26 of
seised to hear the case simply because the chosen court might violate, in some
technical way, a mandatory rule of the State of the court seised. As in the case
of manifest injustice, the standard is intended to be high: the provision does not
permit a court to disregard a choice of court agreement simply because it would
not be binding under domestic law.”).
173
Hague Convention, supra note 6, art. 6.
174
Id.
175
Explanatory Report, supra note 148, at 48, para. 154 (“This is
intended to apply to cases where it would not be possible to bring proceedings
before the chosen court. It need not be absolutely impossible, but the situation
must be exceptional. One example would be where there is a war in the State
concerned and its courts are not functioning. Another example would be where
the chosen court no longer exists, or has changed to such a fundamental degree
that it could no longer be regarded as the same court. This exception could be
regarded as an application of the doctrine of frustration (or similar doctrines),
under which a contract is discharged if, due to an unanticipated and
fundamental change of circumstances after its conclusion, it is no longer
possible to carry it out.”).
176
See Hague Convention, supra note 6, art. 3, para. a (“‘[E]xclusive
choice of court agreement’ means an agreement concluded by two or more
parties that meets the requirements of paragraph c) and designates, for the
purpose of deciding disputes which have arisen or may arise in connection with
a particular legal relationship, the courts of one Contracting State or one or
more specific courts of one Contracting State to the exclusion of the
jurisdiction of any other courts.”) (emphasis added),
and id. art. 5, para. 1 (dealing with the chosen court provides: “The court
or courts of a Contracting State designated in an exclusive choice of court
agreement shall have jurisdiction to decide a dispute to which the agreement
applies, unless the agreement is null and void under the law of that State.”
(emphasis added)), and art. 6 (dealing with the non-chosen court states: “A
court of a Contracting State other than that of the chosen court shall suspend or
dismiss proceedings to which an exclusive choice of court agreement applies . .
. .” (emphasis added)).
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the Hague Convention coordinates with the Brussels Convention by
providing substantially that the Brussels Convention prevails when the
case concerns only E.U. residents.177
Once the United States adopts the Convention, many issues
connected to FSC in international agreements will have a solution, both
at the federal level and at the state level.
Indeed, when it takes effect, the Hague Convention will
“preempt” conflicting federal and state law regarding the enforcement
of FSC.178 The standards for enforcement under the Convention will
govern rather than the standards that have been developed in U.S. case
law. In fact, as Professor Walter Heiser has pointed out, “[t]he
mandatory nature of this treaty means that, by virtue of the Supremacy
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, its standards preempt inconsistent state
and federal law in cases where the Convention applies.” 179
Even after ratification of the Hague Convention by the United
States, however, a number of questions regarding the enforceability of
FSCs may arise. Article 6 of the Convention provides that “a court of a
Contracting State . . . shall suspend or dismiss proceedings” brought in
that court in favor of the chosen court unless one of five grounds
exists.180 Two of these grounds are quite broad and ill-defined,
however. First, the court may do so if “giving effect to the agreement
would lead to a manifest injustice or would be manifestly contrary to
the public policy of the State of the court seised.” 181 Second, the
“seised” court may refuse to suspend or dismiss if “for exceptional
reasons beyond the control of the parties, the agreement cannot
reasonably be performed.” 182 Article 6 does not mention the concepts
of “unreasonableness,” “unfairness,” and “inconvenience,” which
pervade the law of FSC in the U.S. After the Convention takes effect,
however, U.S. courts may continue to apply these older doctrines to a
greater or lesser extent under the new Convention categories of
“manifest injustice,” or “would be manifestly contrary to the public
policy” or cannot “reasonably be performed.”
Indeed, one
commentator has already concluded that the Hague Convention will
make little change in U.S. law regarding the enforcement of FSC,

177
178
179
180
181
182

See Explanatory Report, supra note 148, at 25-26, para. 26.
Heiser, supra note 82, at 1013.
Id. at 1039.
See Hague Convention, supra note 6, art. 6.
Id. para. c.
Id. para. d.
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except for reversing the interpretation of such clauses from permissive
to exclusive.183
In addition, many international commercial contracts are not
subject to the Hague Convention. General principles of U.S. law
regarding FSC will continue to apply to these contracts.
When the Hague Convention goes into effect, courts will have an
opportunity to consider anew the grounds for refusing to enforce FSCs.
The argument of this paper—that efficiency and reasonable expectation
of contracting parties justify limiting the grounds for denial of
enforcement of international commercial FSC to ordinary contract
grounds, excluding reasonableness, unfairness, and inconvenience—is
therefore particularly timely and important at this moment before the
Hague Convention takes effect.

III. ANALOGY WITH ARBITRATION CLAUSES
This section argues that there is a strong analogy between FSCs
and arbitration clauses based on history, policy, and interpretation.
Despite this affinity, the standards for enforcement of FSCs are
currently more demanding than the standards for enforcement of
arbitration agreements.184 Arbitration agreements are enforceable so
long as they comply with basic contractual requirements. 185 Standards
such as unreasonableness, unfairness, violation of public policy, and
oppressive bargaining power, which apply to FSCs (although as Part I
shows the exact meaning and application of these standards is unclear),
do not apply to arbitration agreements. This disparity in treatment for
analogous concepts provides support for the argument of Part IV that
FSCs between commercial parties in international transactions should
be enforceable so long as they meet basic contractual requirements.

183

See Heiser, supra note 82, at 1049.
See Mariana Isabel Hernández-Gutiérrez, Forum-Selection and
Arbitration Clauses in International Commercial Contracts: Does the New
York Convention Call for a Heightened Enforceability Standard? 18
CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 55 (2009) (for a comparison between the standard
of enforcement of arbitration clauses and FSCs).
185
See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
184
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A. HISTORY OF AND POLICY REGARDING ENFORCEABILITY OF
ARBITRATION CLAUSES
Historically, courts treated arbitration clauses skeptically because
they were viewed as ousting courts of jurisdiction. 186 Congress
changed this judicial attitude with the enactment of the Federal
Arbitration Act (“FAA”) in 1925. Section 2 of the Act states:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a
contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction,
or the refusal to perform the whole or any part
thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to
arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such
a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract (emphasis added).187
The FAA was based on two policies: cost reduction and freedom
of contract. As the Court said in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, Co., the
FAA was designed “to avoid ‘the costliness and delays of litigation,’
and to place arbitration agreements ‘upon the same footing as other
contracts.’”188 Arbitration agreements can reduce the cost of litigation
because they can eliminate or minimize discovery costs, increase the
speed of dispute resolution, avoid lengthy jury trials, and minimize the
possibility of appeal. However, some critics of arbitration have
complained that the broad enforcement of arbitration agreements
beyond commercial disputes involving sophisticated parties results in
unfairness.189

186
See Kevin A. Sullivan, Comment, The Problems of Permitting
Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards under the Federal Arbitration
Act, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 509 (2002) (for the historic evolution of the attitude
towards the arbitration clause).
187
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
188
Scherk, 417 U.S. at 510-11.
189
See H.R. Res. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009) (enacted) [Hereinafter
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009] (the Bill makes the following assumptions:
“(1) The Federal Arbitration Act (now enacted as chapter 1 of title 9 of the
United States Code) was intended to apply to disputes between commercial
entities of generally similar sophistication and bargaining power. (2) A series
of United States Supreme Court decisions have changed the meaning of the Act
so that it now extends to disputes between parties of greatly disparate economic
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B. INTERPRETATION OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES
1.

Deference to Arbitration in General

In interpreting and applying the FAA, the Supreme Court, time
and time again, has shown great deference to arbitration. While a
complete review of the Supreme Court’s arbitration decisions is beyond
the scope of this paper, a few examples are sufficient to make the point
that the Supreme Court has in cases of doubt adopted principles that
favor arbitration.
First, the Supreme Court has clarified that courts have a duty to
enforce arbitration agreements even when the agreement relates to
claims of statutory violations. For example, in Shearson/American
Express Inc. v. McMahon, the Supreme Court declared that
[t]he Arbitration Act . . . establishes a “federal policy
favoring arbitration,” Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U. S. 1,
460 U.S. 24 (1983), requiring that “we rigorously
enforce agreements to arbitrate.” Dean Witter
Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, supra, at 470 U.S. 221. This
duty to enforce arbitration agreements is not
diminished when a party bound by an agreement
raises a claim founded on statutory rights.190

power, such as consumer disputes and employment disputes . . . . (3) Most
consumers and employees have little or no meaningful option whether to
submit their claims to arbitration . . . . (5) Mandatory arbitration undermines the
development of public law for civil rights and consumer rights, because there is
no meaningful judicial review of arbitrators' decisions . . . . (6) Mandatory
arbitration is a poor system for protecting civil rights and consumer rights
because it is not transparent . . . . (7) Many corporations add to their arbitration
clauses unfair provisions that deliberately tilt the systems against individuals,
including provisions that strip individuals of substantive statutory rights, ban
class actions, and force people to arbitrate their claims hundreds of miles from
their homes . . . .” Among other things, the Bill—if approved—would modify
the FAA by prohibiting pre-dispute arbitration clauses in employment,
consumer, franchise disputes, and civil rights disputes. The Bill would insert
the following in Section 2 of FAA: “(b) No predispute arbitration agreement
shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of – (1) an employment,
consumer, or franchise dispute; or (2) a dispute arising under any statute
intended to protect civil rights.”).
190
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987).
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Second, the Supreme Court has held that the FAA applies both in
federal and in state courts.191 Therefore, the FAA preempts state laws
on enforceability of arbitration provisions. Third, the Supreme Court
has made clear that the grounds for review of arbitration awards cannot
be expanded.192
Fourth, the Supreme Court has stated the important doctrine of
“separability” in relation to arbitration. The doctrine was stated for the
first time in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.,
where the Court held that because an arbitration clause is a separate
contract from the contract containing the arbitration clause, the claim of
fraud in the inducement of the contract as a whole (as opposed to fraud
with regard to the arbitration clause itself) must be decided by the
arbitrator. 193 After Prima Paint, courts have consistently applied this
doctrine to voidable contracts but not to void contracts. 194 In Buckeye
Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, the Supreme Court reinforced and
expanded the separability doctrine of Prima Paint by applying the
doctrine to claims of voidness: “We reaffirm today that, regardless of
whether the challenge is brought in federal or state court, a challenge to
the validity of the contract as a whole, and not specifically to the
arbitration clause, must go to the arbitrator.” 195
Buckeye Check Cashing is also important because it makes clear
that the separability doctrine applies also in state courts and preempts
any inconsistent state law because the doctrine rests on Section 2 of
FAA, which applies in both federal and state proceedings: 196
“[separability] ultimately arises out of § 2, the FAA’s substantive
command that arbitration agreements be treated like all other
191
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1984) (“We would
expect that if Congress, in enacting the Arbitration Act, was creating what it
thought to be a procedural rule applicable only in federal courts, it would not so
limit the Act to transactions involving commerce. On the other hand, Congress
would need to call on the Commerce Clause if it intended the Act to apply in
state courts. Yet at the same time, its reach would be limited to transactions
involving interstate commerce. We therefore view the ‘involving commerce’
requirement in §2, not as an inexplicable limitation on the power of the federal
courts, but as a necessary qualification on a statute intended to apply in state
and federal courts.”)
192
See Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 578 (2008).
193
See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,
403 (1967).
194
See Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Law's Separability Doctrine After
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 8 NEV. L.J. 107, 110-11 (2007).
195
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006).
196
Id. at 446-47.
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contracts.”197
Fifth, the Supreme Court has issued important decisions with
reference to the power of arbitrators. In fact, between issuing the two
separability decisions of Prima Paint and Buckeye Check Cashing, the
Supreme Court unanimously decided First Options of Chicago, Inc., v.
Kaplan, which held that when the parties did not agree on who should
decide the arbitrability issue, arbitrability is subject to independent
review by the courts.198 First Options stands for the proposition that
the parties can decide whether to insert a clause in the agreement that
delegates to an arbitrator the power to decide the arbitrability of the
dispute.199 In the case of First Options, the parties had not delegated
this power to the arbitrator; therefore the power stayed with the
court.200
Most recently, in June 2010, the Supreme Court decided Rent-ACenter, Inc. v. Jackson, in which the parties had delegated certain
powers (in particular the power to decide unconscionability issues) to
the arbitrator. 201 The specific issue for the Court here was whether “a
district court may decide a claim that an arbitration agreement is
unconscionable, where the agreement explicitly assigns that decision to
the arbitrator.”202 The Supreme Court held that a court could not.203
Rent-A-Center v. Jackson stands for the proposition that where an
agreement to arbitrate includes a clause that the arbitrator will
determine the enforceability of the agreement, if a party challenges
specifically the enforceability of that particular delegation agreement,
the district court considers the challenge, but if a party challenges the
enforceability of the agreement as a whole, the challenge is for the
arbitrator.204

197

Id. at 447.
First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 947 (1995).
199
Id. at 944-45.
200
Id.
201
Rent-A-Ctr., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2775 (2010).
202
Id. (Even if Rent-a-Center is not a case on severability, in footnote 3
of the majority’s opinion, Justice Scalia reaffirms that severability is the rule
also with an agreement of this type: “[The dissent] gives no logical reason why
an agreement to arbitrate one controversy (an employment-discrimination
claim) is not severable from an agreement to arbitrate a different controversy
(enforceability). There is none.”) Id. at 2779 n.3.
203
Id. at 2780-81.
204
See Alan Scott Rau, Comments on Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v.
Jackson, CONVERSATIONS ABOUT DISPUTE RESOLUTION (June 22, 2010),
http://www.karlbayer.com/blog/?p=9699. (As one scholar has correctly pointed
198
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Deference to Arbitration of International Contracts Between
Commercial Parties

The Supreme Court has shown a particular willingness to enforce
arbitration agreements between sophisticated commercial parties in an
international setting. In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, Co., the Supreme
Court held that an arbitration agreement between an American buyer
and a German seller to arbitrate in Paris all disputes arising from a
contract to sell three enterprises was enforceable even though the
dispute involved claims of fraud under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. 205 In reaching this decision the Court distinguished Wilko v.
Swann where the Court had held that an agreement to arbitrate claims
under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 was unenforceable.
206
While the Court found that there were linguistic differences
between the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act,207 its decision was based in
part on the policy considerations involved in international contracts
between commercial parties.208 The Court stated that, unlike Wilko,
Scherk involved a “truly international agreement” that raised different
policies and considerations:
. . . [I]n the absence of the arbitration provision
considerable uncertainty existed at the time of the
agreement, and still exists, concerning the law
applicable to the resolution of disputes arising out of
the contract.
Such uncertainty will almost inevitably exist with
respect to any contract touching two or more
countries, each with its own substantive laws and
conflict-of-laws rules. A contractual provision
specifying in advance the forum in which disputes
shall be litigated and the law to be applied is,
therefore, an almost indispensable precondition to
achievement of the orderliness and predictability
essential to any international business transaction.
Furthermore, such a provision obviates the danger
out: “With nothing in the contract, the question of the ‘unconscionability’ of
the arbitration clause—here, unconscionability because of ‘one sidedness,’ and
because of ‘limitations on discovery’—would indeed be a matter for the
court.”).
205
See Scherk, 417 U.S. 506.
206
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953).
207
Scherk, 417 U.S. at 513–15.
208
See id. at 515–17.
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that a dispute under the agreement might be
submitted to a forum hostile to the interests of one of
the parties or unfamiliar with the problem area
involved.209
In addition, and importantly to the thesis of this article, the Court
cited Bremen in support of its conclusion. 210 While Bremen involved a
FSC, the Court found the situations analogous because “an agreement
to arbitrate before a specified tribunal is, in effect, a specialized kind of
forum-selection clause.”211
The enforcement of arbitration clauses in international contracts
has also benefited from the 1970 accession of the United States to the
New York Arbitration Convention. 212 The Supreme Court made
reference to this Convention as a special reason for enforcing an
arbitration agreement in Mitsubishi v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth.213
Before discussing Mitsubishi, let us outline the major points of the New
York Arbitration Convention. 214
First, the Convention establishes a duty for the courts of the
contracting states to enforce a written arbitration agreement (both in the
form of an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement,
signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of correspondence):
The courts must “recognize an agreement” of this sort and “when
seized of an action in a matter in respect of which the parties have
made an [arbitration] agreement,” the court must “at the request of one
of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being
performed.”215
209

Id. at 516.
Id. at 518.
211
Id.
212
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. [hereinafter New York Arbitration
Convention],
available
at
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1959/06/
19590607%2009-35%20PM/Ch_XXII_01p.pdf. The New York Arbitration
Convention has been very successful. As for today, 144 countries have adopted
the Convention. For a complete list of adopting countries, see The New York
Arbitration Convention Contracting States, NEW YORK ARBITRATION
CONVENTION (May 9, 2011), http://www.newyorkconvention.org/new-yorkconvention-countries/contracting-states.
213
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 638 (1985).
214
See The New York Convention, supra note 114.
215
New York Arbitration Convention, supra note 212, art. II. (“(1.) Each
210
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Second, the Convention imposes upon the courts of the
contracting states a duty to recognize and enforce the arbitration
awards;216 the recognition and enforcement can be refused only on the
(limited) grounds established by Article V.217
As a consequence of the Convention, when the parties have
agreed in writing to devolve their controversy (actual or potential) to
arbitration, there is no possibility to sue in front of a court. 218 If a party
Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the
parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have
arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal
relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of
settlement by arbitration. (2.) The term “agreement in writing” shall include an
arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or
contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams. (3.) The court of a
Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of which the
parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article, shall, at the
request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that
the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being
performed.” (emphasis added)).
216
Id. art. III. (“Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as
binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the
territory where the award is relied upon, under the conditions laid down in the
following articles.” (emphasis added)).
217
Id. art. V. (“(1.) (“Recognition and enforcement of the award may be
refused, at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party
furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is
sought, proof that: (a) The parties to the agreement . . . . were, under the law
applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid
under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication
thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made; or (b) The
party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the
appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise
unable to present his case; or (c) The award deals with a difference not
contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration,
or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to
arbitration . . . . ; or (d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral
procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing
such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the
arbitration took place; or (e) The award has not yet become binding on the
parties . . . . (emphasis added). (2.) Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral
award may also be refused if the competent authority in the country where
recognition and enforcement is sought finds that: (a) The subject matter of the
difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that
country; or (b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary
to the public policy of that country.”).
218
Id. art. II.
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tries to do that, the court, on request of the other party, must refuse to
hear the case and must refer the controversy to the arbitrator. 219 Once
the arbitrator has rendered an arbitration award, the award is binding 220
and shall easily be recognized and enforced in any contracting state221
unless one of the grounds listed in Article V is present. 222 It is
undisputable that there is no reasonableness analysis and the space
given to public policy is quite reduced. The arbitration agreement is
obviously interpreted as “exclusive,” because any court has the duty to
refuse to hear the case unless “it finds that the said agreement is null
and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed”. 223 The
Convention is clearly inspired by a freedom-of-contract principle and
shows significant confidence in the ability of the parties to protect
themselves in negotiations.
Mitsubishi v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth involved a multi-party
contract for the distribution and sale of automobiles among two
Japanese corporations, a Swiss corporation, and a Puerto Rican
corporation. 224 The agreement contained a clause providing for
arbitration by the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association. 225 After
disputes arose, Mitsubishi brought suit under the federal Arbitration
Act and the New York Convention, seeking an order to compel
arbitration of the disputes in accordance with the arbitration clause. 226
The case included claims for violation of the U.S. antitrust laws.227 The
court of appeals, applying American Safety Equipment Corp., held that
antitrust claims were not arbitrable. 228 The Supreme Court reversed
and held in favor of arbitration relying on the “liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements.”229

219

Id. art. II, para. 3.
Id. art. III.
221
Id. art. IV.
222
Id. art. V.
223
Id. art. II, para. 3.
224
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 614.
225
Id.
226
Id.
227
Id.
228
See id. at 623 ((endorsing the doctrine based upon Am. Safety Equip.
Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968)) (uniformly followed
by the courts of appeal, holding that rights conferred by the antitrust laws are
inappropriate for enforcement by arbitration)).
229
Id. at 625-26.
220
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Importantly, the Supreme Court held that the reasons for
enforcing an arbitration clause were particularly compelling in an
international setting:
[W]e conclude that concerns of international comity,
respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational
tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the
international commercial system for predictability in
the resolution of disputes require that we enforce the
parties’ agreement, even assuming that a contrary
result would be forthcoming in a domestic context.
Even before Scherk, this Court had recognized the
utility of forum-selection clauses in international
transactions.230
In Mitsubishi the Court treated arbitration clauses and FSC the
same but specified that the enforcement of an arbitration clause was
reinforced by federal statutes and international treaties. 231 The
reference is to the New York Arbitration Convention:
Bremen and Scherk establish a strong presumption in
favor of enforcement of freely negotiated contractual
choice-of-forum provisions. Here . . . that
presumption is reinforced by the emphatic federal
policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution. And at
least since this Nation’s accession in 1970 to the
Convention . . . and the implementation of the
Convention in the same year by amendment of the
Federal Arbitration Act, that federal policy applies
with special force in the field of international
commerce. Thus, we must weigh the concerns of
American Safety against a strong belief in the
efficacy of arbitral procedures for the resolution of
international commercial disputes and an equal
commitment to the enforcement of freely negotiated
choice-of-forum clauses.232
In addition to the New York Arbitration Convention, the United
States is also party to the 1979 Inter-American Convention on
International Commercial Arbitration (the “Panama Convention”). 233
230

Id. at 629.
See id. at 634-40.
232
Id. at 631.
233
United Nations Panama Convention Establishing the Latin American
Economic System (SELA), Oct. 17, 1975, 1292 U.N.T.S. 21295 [hereinafter
231
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The Panama Convention governs international arbitral awards between
the signatory states.234 There are differences between the Panama and
the New York Conventions, for example the grounds for recognition
and enforcement of arbitral awards under the two conventions
diverge.235 The Panama Convention, unlike the New York Convention,
contains a provision that makes the rules of procedures of the InterAmerican Commercial Arbitration Commission the default rules in
case the parties do not agree otherwise. 236 While a full analysis of the
Panama Convention is outside the scope of this paper,237 we want to
highlight that, like the New York Convention, reasonableness is not a
requirement for enforceability under the Panama Convention. 238 Public
policy is not a reason to avoid enforcement of an arbitration clause but
only a possible ground for nonenforcement of an arbitration award.
C. ANALOGY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS TO FSCS
There is a close affinity between arbitration agreements and
FSCs. This affinity supports the argument that in international
commercial agreements, FSCs should not be burdened by special
enforcement hurdles.239
First, arbitration agreements and FSCs have undergone a similar
evolution. Both were originally disfavored because they ousted courts
of jurisdiction. Both have undergone a modern evolution in which
disfavor has been transformed into support. As the Fourth Circuit
stated in Albemarle Corp. v. AstraZeneca, LP: “[The] historical
Panama Convention]. The Panama Convention entered into force on June 16,
1976. The U.S. deposited its instrument of ratification with the OAS
(Organization of American States) on September 27, 1990. The Panama
Convention has been incorporated into U.S. law through §§ 301-07 of the FAA.
234
Id. The countries bound by the Panama Convention (as of 2002) are:
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, USA, Uruguay,
Venezuela. All these countries have also adopted the New York Convention.
Even if the Convention was open to states located outside the American
continent, none have accessed.
235
Compare id. art. V, with New York Arbitration Convention, supra
note 212, art. V.
236
Panama Convention, supra note 233, art. III.
237
For a comprehensive analysis of the Panama Convention and of the
differences between the Panama and the New York Conventions, see generally
JOHN P. BOWMAN, PANAMA CONVENTION AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION UNDER THE
FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT (2002).
238
For the grounds of invalidity of an arbitral agreement, see Panama
Convention, supra note 233, art. V.
239
See infra pt. IV.
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reluctance to enforce [FSCs] . . . was not unlike the historical
reluctance to enforce arbitration clauses.”240 It is true that the FAA was
a major force in the development of arbitration, while there has been no
such legislation regarding FSCs, but this difference is probably
overstated, as discussed below.
Second, arbitration agreements and FSCs perform similar
functions and are based on similar policy considerations. Both
arbitration agreements and FSCs are methods of dispute resolution.
The enforceability of both arbitration agreements and FSCs is based on
policies of freedom of contract and cost reduction, although the mix of
cost reduction is different for the two types of clauses. Arbitration
agreements can reduce the cost of litigation because they can eliminate
or minimize discovery costs, increase the speed of dispute resolution,
avoid lengthy jury trials, and minimize the possibility of appeal. FSCs
can reduce litigation costs by eliminating or minimizing disputes over
the appropriate forum. In addition, the use of a particular forum can
reduce litigation costs depending on the law of that forum, for example
whether it allows discovery or jury trials, and can also reduce the time
of litigation, depending on the burden of that court’s roll.
Third, the Supreme Court has recognized the similarity of
arbitration clauses and FSCs, particularly in the international context.
In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., the Court stated: “An agreement to
arbitrate before a specified tribunal is, in effect, a specialized kind of
forum selection clause.”241 In Mitsubishi v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
while upholding the enforceability of an international arbitration
agreement, the Court relied on its prior decisions dealing with FSCs:
“Bremen and Scherk establish a strong presumption in favor of
enforcement of freely negotiated contractual choice-of-forum
provisions.”242
To be sure, there is a major difference between the change in
policy regarding arbitration clauses and FSCs. The change in judicial
attitude toward arbitration clauses resulted at least initially from an act
of Congress that specified the grounds for enforcing such clauses, i.e.
the FAA. The change in attitude with regard to FSCs came from
judicial decision. While Bremen and Carnival Cruise show a
fundamental change in judicial treatment of FSCs, the Court hedged its
240

Albemarle, 628 F.3d at 649.
Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519.
242
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 631 (1985).
241
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holdings. The restrictions on FSCs, however, probably are more
reflective of limitations on the judicial role than a fundamentally
different treatment of arbitration clauses and FSCs. Not surprisingly,
courts are reluctant to make a statutory-like change in the law because
they do not have the authority to make law for future situations and
because they have doubts about their ability to foresee all the possible
situations that may arise. In addition, FSCs may now be undergoing a
similar evolution through conventions and statutory enactment. The
United States has signed the Hague Convention. Assuming it is
ratified, an act of Congress will implement the Convention, providing a
further parallel between arbitration agreements and FSCs.

IV.

SOME POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE UNSOLVED ISSUES
REGARDING FSCS

Part I of the paper has shown that there are a number of
unresolved issues regarding the enforceability and interpretation of
FSCs. This section offers answers to these questions. Anticipating the
specific answers discussed below, the general argument of this section
is that FSCs contained in international commercial agreements should
be subject to the same rules that govern the enforceability of arbitration
clauses. Under this principle courts should discard the limitations of
reasonableness, unfairness, and oppressive bargaining power; the
public policy limitation should be narrowed to situations in which
under general contract principles a FSC would be unenforceable as a
matter of public policy. The argument of this section is compatible
with the Hague Convention, once it goes into effect, if the courts
interpret, as it is our opinion they should, (a) “manifest injustice” as
used in the Convention to mean “unenforceability as a matter of
contract law” and (b) “public policy” to mean “unenforceable as a
matter of public policy under general principles of contract law.” Part
A of this section sets forth the policy arguments in favor of the
principle set forth in this section. Parts B, C, and D apply this principle
to the limitations on FSCs developed by the Supreme Court in Bremen
and Carnival Cruise. Part E argues that the interpretation of a FSC
should be according to the law of the chosen court. Part F contends
that unless the parties have specified otherwise in their clause, courts
should interpret a FSC as exclusive.
A. POLICY ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF RESTRICTING THE BASES FOR
DENYING ENFORCEMENT OF FSCS TO THE GROUNDS APPLICABLE TO
ORDINARY CONTRACTS
The policy arguments that are the basis of this section find
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expression in Bremen. There the Court stated:
The threshold question is whether [the trial court] . . .
should have exercised its jurisdiction to do more than
give effect to the legitimate expectations of the
parties, manifested in their freely negotiated
agreement, by specifically enforcing the forum
clause.
There are compelling reasons why a freely negotiated
private international agreement, unaffected by fraud,
undue influence, or overweening bargaining
power,243 such as that involved here, should be given
full effect. In this case . . . , the tow of an extremely
costly piece of equipment . . . was to traverse the
waters of many jurisdictions . . . there were countless
possible ports of refuge. . . . It cannot be doubted for
a moment that the parties sought to provide for a
neutral forum for the resolution of any disputes
arising during the tow. Manifestly much uncertainty
and possibly great inconvenience to both parties
could arise if a suit could be maintained in any
jurisdiction in which an accident might occur or if
jurisdiction were left to any place where Bremen or
Unterweser might happen to be found. The
elimination of all such uncertainties by agreeing in
advance on a forum acceptable to both parties is an
indispensable element in international trade,
commerce, and contracting. There is strong evidence
that the forum clause was a vital part of the
agreement, and it would be unrealistic to think that
the parties did not conduct their negotiations,
including fixing the monetary terms, with the
consequences of the forum clause figuring
prominently in their calculations. 244 (Emphasis
added).
In this passage the Court gives essentially two reasons for the
enforceability of a FSC: First, the Court emphasizes the principle of
freedom of contract both in general and by specific reference to the
243

Bremen, 407 U.S. 1. This article argues that the limitation of
“overweening bargaining power” should not apply in an international
commercial contract. See infra pt. IV at D.
244
Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12-14.
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likelihood that the parties considered the effect of the clause in their
negotiations of the contract.245 Second, the Court offers an efficiency
justification for enforcement of the clause in this type of case. 246
Because of the possibility of multiple jurisdictions in which a case
could be brought, enforcement of the clause eliminates the costly
uncertainty and inconvenience that would result.
The efficiency justification offered by the Court operates at a
micro level, i.e. the level of the parties to a particular contract where
uncertainty may arise about the forum that governs the resolution of
their specific dispute. In another passage of Bremen the Court makes a
broader, macro efficiency argument, based on the needs of American
companies in international commerce:
The expansion of American business and industry
will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn
contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all
disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our
courts. Absent a contract forum, the considerations
relied on by the Court of Appeals would be
persuasive reasons for holding an American forum
convenient in the traditional sense, but in an era of
expanding world trade and commerce, the absolute
aspects of the doctrine of the Carbon Black case have
little place and would be a heavy hand indeed on the
future development of international commercial
dealings by Americans. We cannot have trade and
commerce in world markets and international waters
exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and
resolved in our courts.247

245

See id. 12-14 (In another part of the opinion the Court emphasizes
freedom of contract as a justification for the enforceability of FSC: “It accords
with ancient concepts of freedom of contract and reflects an appreciation of the
expanding horizons of American contractors who seek business in all parts of
the world. Not surprisingly, foreign businessmen prefer, as do we, to have
disputes resolved in their own courts, but if that choice is not available, then in
a neutral forum with expertise in the subject matter. Plainly, the courts of
England meet the standards of neutrality and long experience in admiralty
litigation. The choice of that forum was made in an arm’s-length negotiation
by experienced and sophisticated businessmen, and absent some compelling
and countervailing reason it should be honored by the parties and enforced by
the courts.”). Id. at 11-12.
246
See id. at 11-12.
247
Id. at 9.
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The change in scope of commerce from local to international is one of
the reasons why full enforceability of a FSC is particularly important.
In a global market, not enforcing a FSC allows litigation in a place and
under a law that might be completely different from the one that the
parties had in mind when they chose the forum. This was not true in
days when commerce was primarily local. In those days the disregard
of a FSC would probably (although not always) had little impact on the
result. For example, a lawsuit between a Florida and a New York
company—whether brought in Florida or New York—would be based
on similar common law and statutory provisions.
The uncertainty of FSC enforcement represents a legal obstacle to
competitiveness.248 A broader approach to enforceability would be
particularly important in a time of recession—one we have been living
in recent years—as a way to increase business for American
companies. Indeed in 1972, a year between two recessions, the
Supreme Court opined that the unenforceability of a FSC acted as a
hindrance for American commerce.249 Today, in a highly competitive
global market, the current and uncertain limitations on enforceability
risk to have the same effect.
In addition to freedom of contract and efficiency, both fairness
and history support general enforceability of FSCs. Uncertainty
regarding the enforceability of FSCs can create unfairness to the party
seeking relief for breach of contract. Jurisdiction (along with venue) is
a major litigation issue both in the U.S. and in many other countries.
Sir Anthony Clarke, English Master of the Rolls, shows the prevalence
and potential unfairness of jurisdictional uncertainty:
I have spent much of my professional life both at the
Bar and as a judge dealing with cases in which
parties, usually defendants, have done their utmost to
avoid having the dispute tried on the merits in
England. Arguments of every kind have been
deployed over the years to persuade courts that the
interests of justice lie in the issues being determined
elsewhere, although in very many cases the true
position is that the defendant’s real interest is to
ensure (if at all possible) that the issues will in
248
See generally Daniel Mitchell, Competitiveness Means Less
Government, Not More, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Apr. 20, 2006),
http://heritage.org/research/reports/2006/04/competitiveness-means-lessgovernment-not-more.
249
Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9.

2012]

ENFORCEABILITY OF FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES:
A “GALLANT KNIGHT” STILL SEEKING ELDORADO

253

practice never be determined at all.250
In the current situation, however, with the enforceability of FSCs
subject to a standard of reasonableness, to unclear policy limitations,
and to a narrow interpretation of permissiveness, the insertion of a FSC
in an agreement fails to produce certainty; indeed any of these issues
can be the subject of much litigation. By contrast, eliminating the
reasonableness analysis, circumscribing the public policy limitations to
those applicable to contracts in general, and interpreting clauses
according to the law of the chosen forum and as exclusive would
substantially increase certainty in the enforcement of FSCs in
accordance with the intention of the parties when the contract was
formed.
Finally, restrictions on the enforceability of FSCs are unsound as
a matter of history. As the Court said in Bremen:
The argument that such clauses are improper because
they tend to “oust” a court of jurisdiction is hardly
more than a vestigial legal fiction. It appears to rest at
core on historical judicial resistance to any attempt to
reduce the power and business of a particular court
and has little place in an era when all courts are
overloaded and when businesses once essentially
local now operate in world markets. 251
In addition, as discussed above, there is a close relationship
between FSCs and arbitration clauses. The Supreme Court has said an
arbitration clause is a form of FSC. 252 Over the last century
enforceability of arbitration clauses has evolved from nonenforceable
to enforceable, subject to contractual limitations on their enforcement.
While the FAA and the New York Arbitration Convention were a
significant impetus for this change, the policy reasons for the full
enforcement of FSCs are similar to the justifications for the full
enforcement of arbitration clauses. This paper argues in essence that
the standards for enforcement of FSCs should evolve like the standards
for arbitration clauses, i.e. full enforcement limited only by the
defenses applicable to ordinary contracts.

250

The Right Honourable Sir Anthony Clarke, Master of the Rolls, The
Differing Approach to Commercial Litigation in the European Court of Justice
and the Courts of England and Wales (Feb. 23, 2006), available at
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/media/speeches/2006/speech-mor-23022006.
251
Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12.
252
Scherk, 417 U.S. 506.
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B. FSCS SHOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO A REASONABLENESS ANALYSIS
For the reasons given above, a FSC in an international
commercial contract should not be subject to reasonableness analysis.
When courts engage in a reasonableness analysis they substitute their
judgment for the judgment of the parties regarding what is reasonable,
which is inconsistent with the basic principle of freedom of contract.
Moreover, as was true in Bremen, in international commercial contracts
there is always the possibility of multiple fora for the litigation.
Presumably the parties took this possibility into account when they
chose their forum in the contract. Evaluation of the reasonableness of
FSCs increases uncertainty and litigation costs. Moreover, as Judge
Clarke remarked, claims of unreasonableness are often made by
defendants to avoid having the case decided at all, an obviously unfair
situation.253
In the U.S. courts do not engage in reasonableness analysis when
enforcing arbitration clauses. Considering the similarity between FSCs
and arbitration clauses, FSCs should also not be subject to a
reasonableness analysis.
We are not aware of other countries applying a reasonableness
analysis because certainty is a high value elsewhere. 254 In addition,
international treaties—like the Hague Convention—dealing with FSCs
do not provide for a reasonableness analysis. The U.S. government has
shown its appreciation of the Hague Convention by signing it in
January 2009.
C.

THE PUBLIC POLICY LIMITATION ON FSCS SHOULD BE THE SAME AS
APPLICABLE TO CONTRACTS IN GENERAL

We have seen above that it is unclear which public policies might
make a FSC clause unenforceable. It might be that the limitation based
on forum public policy is only applicable where the transaction does
not present elements of “internationality” (i.e., only where the contract
is between two Americans to solve an inherently local transaction).
Should this view be correct, the uncertainty coming from the public
policy limitation would be less significant. However, it is unclear
whether the public policy limitation is in fact this restricted.
No one can seriously doubt that every situation of uncertainty in
253

See Clarke, supra note 250 and accompanying text.
For example, the European legal system seems more focused on
“certainty” than on fairness and efficiency. See, e.g., Brussels I Regulation,
supra note 118, at 1, 2 (“The rules of jurisdiction must be highly predictable.”).
254
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the enforceability of a contractual provision represents a possible
hindrance to trade. The uncertainty arising from the lack of clarity
about the public policy limitation has an easy remedy: FSCs should not
be subject to a special public policy analysis. Instead the issue should
be solved applying general contractual principles.
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts §178 provides when a
contractual term is void because of violation of public policy:
A promise or other term of an agreement is
unenforceable on grounds of public policy if [i]
legislation provides that it is unenforceable or [ii] the
interest in its enforcement is clearly outweighed in
the circumstances by a public policy against the
enforcement of such terms.255
In other words, the Restatement provides for two situations of
unenforceability: (1) There is a statute that provides that a certain
contractual term is unenforceable because of public policy, which is
rare;256 (2) the court is called to make a balance between the public
policy and the interest for enforcement.
Even if uncertainty would not completely disappear under this
balancing analysis, it would greatly diminish because the type of
balance that the court has to do is quite structured. Restatement §178(2)
and (3) provide that:
(2) In weighing the interest in the enforcement of a
term, account is taken of (a) the parties’ justified
expectations, (b) any forfeiture that would result if
255

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) (1981).
Id. § 178 cmt. a (“Legislation providing for unenforceability.
Occasionally, on grounds of public policy, legislation provides that specified
kinds of promises or other terms are unenforceable. Whether such legislation is
valid and applicable to the particular term in dispute is beyond the scope of this
Restatement. Assuming that it is, the court is bound to carry out the legislative
mandate with respect to the enforceability of the term. But with respect to such
other matters as the enforceability of the rest of the agreement (§§ 183, 184)
and the possibility of restitution (Topic 5), a court will be guided by the same
rules that apply to other terms unenforceable on grounds of public policy . . . .
absent contrary provision in the legislation itself . . . . The term “legislation” is
used here in the broadest sense to include any fixed text enacted by a body with
authority to promulgate rules, including not only statutes, but constitutions and
local ordinances, as well as administrative regulations issued pursuant to them.
It also encompasses foreign laws to the extent that they are applicable under
conflict of laws rules.”).
256
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enforcement were denied, and (c) any special public
interest in the enforcement of the particular term.
(3) In weighing a public policy against enforcement
of a term, account is taken of (a) the strength of that
policy as manifested by legislation or judicial
decisions, (b) the likelihood that a refusal to enforce
the term will further that policy, (c) the seriousness of
any misconduct involved and the extent to which it
was deliberate, and (d) the directness of the
connection between that misconduct and the term.
In addition, courts have the guidance of the comments to
Restatement §178 both on the balancing factors257 and on the
evaluation of the strength of a public policy.258
Applying this standard, it would be very rare that a FSC in an
international commercial contract would be unenforceable. First, as for
257

Id. § 178 cmt. b (“Balancing of interests. Only infrequently does
legislation, on grounds of public policy, provide that a term is unenforceable.
When a court reaches that conclusion, it usually does so on the basis of a public
policy derived either from its own perception of the need to protect some aspect
of the public welfare or from legislation that is relevant to that policy although
it says nothing explicitly about unenforceability. See §179. In some cases the
contravention of public policy is so grave, as when an agreement involves a
serious crime or tort, that unenforceability is plain. In other cases the
contravention is so trivial as that it plainly does not preclude enforcement. In
doubtful cases, however, a decision as to enforceability is reached only after a
careful balancing, in the light of all the circumstances, of the interest in the
enforcement of the particular promise against the policy against the
enforcement of such terms. The most common factors in the balancing process
are set out in Subsections (2) and (3). Enforcement will be denied only if the
factors that argue against enforcement clearly outweigh the law’s traditional
interest in protecting the expectations of the parties, its abhorrence of any
unjust enrichment, and any public interest in the enforcement of the particular
term.”) (emphasis added).
258
Id. § 178 cmt. c (“Strength of policy. The strength of the public policy
involved is a critical factor in the balancing process. Even when the policy is
one manifested by legislation, it may be too insubstantial to outweigh the
interest in the enforcement of the term in question. . . . A court should be
particularly alert to this possibility in the case of minor administrative
regulations or local ordinances that may not be indicative of the general
welfare. A disparity between a relatively modest criminal sanction provided by
the legislature and a much larger forfeiture that will result if enforcement of the
promise is refused may suggest that the policy is not substantial enough to
justify the refusal.”).
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the violation of a statutory public policy, we are unaware of any statute
that declares a FSC unenforceable. Second, as for the balancing test,
let us take an example taken from Bremen. In Bremen, the Court
discussed the public policy involved in the Bisso doctrine.259 Under the
approach suggested above, a court in deciding whether to enforce a
FSC in an international towing contract would balance the interest in
FSC enforcement against the public policy against enforcement of
exculpatory clauses in such contracts. The balance would strongly
favor enforcement of FSCs. On the positive side the parties have a
justified expectation in enforcement of a FSC especially because of the
possibility of litigation in multiple jurisdictions. On the negative side
the strength of the public policy is weak because the Bisso doctrine
applies to accidents that occur in American waters, which was not the
situation in Bremen. Obviously, the reasoning would be different in
case of an accident that occurred in domestic waters between two
American companies; the strength of the public policy would be greater
because the Bisso doctrine applies in that setting. In this case, the
strength of Bisso would be enough to overcome the FSC because the
parties would not have a justified expectation in enforcement of a
clause that avoids their national law. In case of an accident taking
place in domestic waters between international parties, the FSC should
probably be enforceable. Indeed, in such a case the reasonable
expectations of the parties are that an accident could occur anywhere,
and they want to have the certainty of a chosen forum. The likelihood
that they are trying to avoid the Bisso doctrine is small because they are
not American (they may not even be aware of the doctrine) and because
the possibility of an accident in American waters is remote. As this
example shows, use of the contractual public policy framework should
greatly reduce uncertainty in the enforcement of FSCs.
D. FSCS BETWEEN COMMERCIAL PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL
TRANSACTIONS SHOULD NOT BE UNENFORCEABLE ON THE GROUNDS OF
UNFAIRNESS OR OVERWHELMING BARGAINING POWER
As discussed in Part I, it is unclear whether a court may declare a
FSC unenforceable either because of unfairness or overwhelming
bargaining power. Courts should eliminate these standards for
determining the validity of FSCs. Fairness and overwhelming
bargaining power have no place in evaluating international commercial
contracts.
With regard to fairness, commercial parties are perfectly capable
of determining what is fair to them in the context of their contractual
259

See supra text accompanying note 91.
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relationship, and they are in a much better position than a court to do so
because they are more knowledgeable than the court about their overall
commercial circumstances. Further, imposing a standard of fairness on
FSCs may often produce unfairness because it creates an issue for
litigation that a party can use to delay or perhaps even avoid having a
case decided by any tribunal. 260
With regard to overwhelming bargaining power, in an
international commercial contract a party is unlikely to be the victim of
overwhelming bargaining power if for no other reason than the fact that
the party can walk away from the deal. Further, if because of the need
for a particular product a seller is able to force contractual terms,
including a FSC, on a buyer, the buyer may well be entitled to relief
from the entire contract because of economic duress. To avoid the
application of a FSC, however, the party would have to demonstrate
that the FSC itself is affected by economic duress. If the party only
claims that the contract as a whole is effected by economic duress, the
decision on this issue should go to the selected forum, by virtue of the
severability doctrine.261
E. FSCS SHOULD BE INTERPRETED ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF THE
CHOSEN COURT
Even if, as we said in Part I, it is reasonably certain that federal
law (and not state law) governs the enforceability of a FSC, confusion
still exists under federal law as to what law should govern the
interpretation of a FSC, whether the law of the forum state or the law
of the chosen court. The decisions of the district court and of the Tenth
Circuit in Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., illustrate the confusion.262 Plaintiff
Yavuz, a Turkish citizen, claimed that various Swiss, American, and
Panamanian defendants defrauded him of money used to purchase
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See Clarke, supra note 250.
See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519 n. 14.
In The Bremen, we noted that forum-selection clauses “should be given
full effect” when “a freely negotiated private international agreement [is]
unaffected by fraud . . . .” Bremen, 407 U.S. at 13, 12. This qualification does
not mean that any time a dispute arising out of a transaction is based upon an
allegation of fraud, as in this case, the clause is unenforceable. Rather, it means
that an arbitration or forum selection clause in a contract is not enforceable if
the inclusion of that clause in the contract was the product of fraud or coercion.
Cf. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
See also Muzumdar v. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd., 438 F.3d 759, 762
(7th Cir. 2006); Marra v. Papandreou, 216 F.3d 1119, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
262
Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 465 F.3d 418 (10th Cir. 2006).
261
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property in Tulsa, Oklahoma. 263 Relying on a Swiss FSC in a master
agreement among the parties, the defendants contended that the case
should be litigated in Switzerland.264 The agreement contained the
following FSC: “Place of courts is Fribourg.”265 The agreement also
contained a Swiss choice of law clause but it was unclear whether that
clause applied to the FSC. The district court agreed with the defendants
and dismissed the suit, although the basis of its decision was somewhat
unclear.266 Yavuz appealed and the Tenth Circuit Court reversed
finding that Swiss law governed and that the case should be remanded
to the district court “to permit the parties to present the applicable law
and perhaps to develop further any facts that may be relevant under that
law.”267 The court also indicated that the choice of law issue might be
moot depending on the lower court’s forum non conveniens analysis.268
On remand, the district court again dismissed the case under a
forum non conveniens doctrine. On further appeal by Yavuz, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the dismissal and held that “Switzerland is the
more convenient forum for this dispute.” 269 The lengthy proceedings in
the case show the uncertainty and cost that result when FSC are not
treated with sufficient sanctity.
The Fourth Circuit’s 2010 decision in Albemarle Corp. v
AstraZeneca UK Ltd., may be a step in the right direction in reducing
the uncertainty regarding the law applicable to FSCs, but it does not
completely solve the problem.270 In 2005, AstraZeneca UK Ltd.
(“AstraZeneca”) and Albemarle Corp. (“Albemarle”) entered into a
contract (“2005 Contract”) according to which AstraZeneca would
purchase 80% of its requirements of di-isopropyl-phenol (DIP) from
Albemarle International Corporation, a Virginia corporation of the
Albemarle group.271 AstraZeneca used DIP in the manufacturing of a
branded drug named Diprivan. In the same contract, AstraZeneca
agreed to grant Albemarle a right of first refusal to supply propofol (a
derivative of DIP) in case AstraZeneca decided to shift from DIP to
propofol in the manufacture of Diprivan. In 2006 AstraZeneca did in
fact opt for propofol. Alleging a breach of its right of first refusal,
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271

Id. at 421-24.
Id. at 424-25.
Id. at 422-23.
Id. at 424-27.
Id. at 431.
Id.
Id. at 1169.
Albemarle, 628 F.3d 643.
Id. at 646.
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Albemarle commenced an action against AstraZeneca in the Court of
Common Pleas in Orangeburg, South Carolina. 272
After removing the case to federal court on diversity grounds,
AstraZeneca filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue based on the
choice of law and the FSC contained in the 2005 Contract. The clause
provided that the contract “shall be subject to English Law and the
jurisdiction of the English High Court.” Albemarle contended that the
FSC was only permissive and not exclusive. Albemarle also filed a
motion to enjoin AstraZeneca from litigating in England. 273 The
district court initially denied AstraZeneca’s motion to dismiss; it found
that federal law applied in construing the FSC and therefore the
selection was only permissive.274 On a motion to reconsider by
AstraZeneca, the court vacated its earlier decision. 275 The court
concluded that English law controlled the interpretation of the clause,
and under English law the clause was treated as exclusive.276
Albemarle appealed the order to dismiss. The Fourth Circuit
affirmed.277 The Fourth Circuit recognized that federal law controls the
enforceability and interpretation of FSCs.278 Before deciding whether a
FSC is enforceable, the court must first interpret the clause. In the
interpretation of the clause, the Fourth Circuit found determinative that
the FSC in the 2005 Contract did not stand alone, but was instead
coupled with a choice of law clause. While the language of the FSC
taken out of context appeared to make the clause permissive, the clause
taken in the context of the choice of law clause “does contain what
amounts, in effect, to language of exclusion.” 279 In Albemarle, unlike
272

Id. at 645.
Id. at 646 (“While this litigation was pending, AstraZeneca and
Albemarle entered into a new contract dated June 23, 2008, under which
AstraZeneca agreed to a one-time purchase of DIP from Albemarle [“2008
Contract”]. In this contract, the parties agreed to apply South Carolina law and
to litigate exclusively in South Carolina.”).
274
Id. at 646-47.
275
Id.
276
Id. at 647. The court also held that enforcing the forum selection
clause would not violate any strong public policy of South Carolina. In
addition, on a motion for reconsideration by Albemarle, the Court found that
the 2008 Contract (with its South Carolina choice of law) did not supersede the
2005 Contract.
277
Id. at 653-54.
278
Id. at 650.
279
Id. at 651. The Court begins by remembering the principle laid down
by the US Supreme Court in Bremen that contractual choice of law or choice of
forum clauses must not be disturbed unless they are unreasonable. The Fourth
273

2012]

ENFORCEABILITY OF FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES:
A “GALLANT KNIGHT” STILL SEEKING ELDORADO

261

Yavuz, the interpretation pursuant to foreign law changes the result for
the parties.280
Albemarle can be seen as a step in the right direction with regard
to the enforceability of FSCs, but it can also be read as limiting the
enforceability of such clauses. Suppose, unlike the facts in Albemarle,
but like the situation in Yavuz, the contract has a choice of forum clause
but not a choice of law clause. In that case the Fourth Circuit’s
decision could be read to mean that the clause should be interpreted
under U.S. law to be permissive rather than exclusive, because it would
not have “language of exclusion.”281
With regard to the issue of which law governs the interpretation
of a FSC, two policies are important: fairness and efficiency. Freedom
of contract is a fundamental aspect of fairness because a negotiated
bargain represents what the parties themselves considered to be a fair
agreement. Pursuant to the principle of freedom of contract, courts
should attempt to carry out the reasonable expectations of the parties.
Circuit noted that since 1972, the Supreme Court had rejected the traditional
refusal of American courts to enforce FSC based on the argument that they
would be against public policy (as ousting of the jurisdiction of the court) and
that the principle laid down in Bremen (prima facie enforceability of a
reasonable FSC) was now federal common law. Under federal common law,
when a court interprets a FSC, it must “give effect to the parties’ agreement.”
Id. at 650. Because the parties had agreed that the 2005 Contract “shall be
subject to English Law,” English law has to be used to construe the FSC. As
the parties have stipulated, and as the English High Court has held in
interpreting the same 2005 Contract, according to English law, the FSC must
be interpreted as exclusive. Id. passim.
280
Id. at 651 (“[I]n this case the clause taken in context does contain what
amounts, in effect, to language of exclusion. The clause here includes language
that English law, not American federal law, must be applied. . . . And applying
English law makes a difference, as the parties have recognized and stipulated.
Under English law, when the parties designate the English High Court as an
appropriate forum, the designation is mandatory and exclusive.”) (citation
omitted). The decision of the Fourth Circuit was important for AstraZeneca
because of the result that it in the meantime obtained in England. In May 2010,
the English High Court held that it had jurisdiction over AstraZeneca’s claims
and that, while “the duress and conspiracy claims should be stayed in the light
of the South Carolina court exclusive jurisdiction clause in the 2008
Agreement, the contract claims on the 2005 Contract should go to trial in
England. See AstraZeneca UK Ltd. v. Albemarle Int’l Corp., [2010] EWHC
(Comm) 1028, available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/
2010/1028.html. For subsequent proceeding in the case in England, see
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/2011/1574.html.
281
Albemarle, 628 F.3d at 651.
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If the parties have chosen a particular forum for resolution of a dispute,
it is more probable than not that the parties intended the law of that
jurisdiction to govern the interpretation of the contract. If the parties
had intended for other law to govern, then probably they would have
said so.
Efficiency also supports the view that the law governing the
enforceability of the clause should be the law of chosen jurisdiction.
Such a rule would increase certainty with regard to FSCs and should
reduce litigation expense.
F. COURTS SHOULD INTERPRET FSCS AS EXCLUSIVE RATHER THAN
PERMISSIVE ABSENT A CLEAR MANIFESTATION OF INTENT TO BE
PERMISSIVE
As Albemarle shows, the prevailing view in the U.S. is that in
case of ambiguity FSCs are interpreted to be permissive rather than
exclusive. As a matter of policy, this view is unsound. We urge the
Supreme Court to rule against the presumption in favor of
permissiveness because policy considerations of fairness, efficiency,
historical development of FSCs, and international uniformity support
such a change. Indeed, to the extent that courts in other countries adopt
a permissive interpretation, they also should change that approach.
The arguments for interpreting FSCs as exclusive rather than
permissive are essentially the same as those already made above with
regard to choice of law in interpreting FSCs.
Freedom of contract is a fundamental aspect of fairness because a
negotiated bargain represents what the parties themselves considered to
be a fair agreement. Pursuant to the principle of freedom of contract,
courts should attempt to carry out the reasonable expectations of the
parties. If the parties have chosen a particular forum for resolution of
their dispute, it is more probable than not that the parties intended that
forum to be exclusive. If the parties had intended the forum to be
merely permissive, they would likely have said so or drafted the clause
as a consent to jurisdiction rather than a FSC. 282
When the parties insert a FSC in a contract, they almost certainly
had in mind to exclusively establish the forum where possible
controversies, if any, should be resolved. It is also probable that the
282

A consent-to-jurisdiction clause has the purpose of consenting to the
personal jurisdiction of a certain court over both parties. The language can be,
for example, the following: “The Parties hereby consent to the jurisdiction of
courts of the State of New York.”
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parties took this element into account when negotiating the economics
of the agreement.283 Indeed, a claim is not an infrequent occurrence in
commercial transactions and legal fees and court costs sensibly vary
from one place to another. Besides, it is often true that insurance
policies cover the litigation in one place but do not cover it in another.
The party whose home court has not been chosen, has freely
entered into the agreement and has conceivably benefited in terms of a
reduced price or better conditions. When a claim arises, this party
might regret having accepted a foreign jurisdiction and—ignoring the
FSC—try to bring the claim in his or her home court.284 To allow this
afterthought of a party is quite unfair toward the other party. Had the
other party known of the possibility of being sued in a different tribunal
it could have negotiated different terms or refused the entire
transaction.285
Efficiency also supports the view that in case of ambiguity FSCs
should be interpreted to be exclusive. Such a rule would increase
certainty with regard to FSCs and should reduce litigation expense.
Indeed, the exclusivity rule avoids possible multiplication of fora (like
in Albemarle),286 i.e., the situation in which every party has claims and
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See Bremen, 407 U.S. at 14 (“[I]t would be unrealistic to think that the
parties did not conduct their negotiations, including fixing the monetary terms
[taking into account the FSC].”); See also Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at
594 (when speaking of “reduced fares” for passengers).
284
One cannot reject the possibility of a home-town advantage out of
hand. There is evidence that it exists, even in United States Federal Courts.
Questions of fact and degree arise. However, where two arms length
commercial parties of more or less equal bargaining power, in which I do not
include government controlled corporations, do agree on an exclusive choice of
court clause, it can reasonably be assumed that they are satisfied that neither
party will obtain any such advantage. Governments should respect such a
choice. See Spigelman, supra note 143, at 25. The party whose home-town
has not been chosen, should a claim arise, may lose the “home-town
advantage” (if a home-town advantage she would have in her jurisdiction); but
for the sake of commerce and in the perspective of freedom of contract to
which international treaties and western economies are both imprinted, why
should the parties’ contractual intent not be respected?
285
There might be parties—especially if unrepresented by a lawyer—that
were unaware that an exclusive FSC bars the possibility of suing elsewhere.
These parties, however, make a choice: they chose to enter into an agreement
without legal advice. The choice might have been based on cost saving. Once
a claim arises, it is fundamentally unfair to allow parties to sue in a different
forum, alleging their own ignorance of the consequences of a FSC.
286
Albemarle, 628 F.3d 643.
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presents them to different tribunals.
In economic terms, the exclusivity rule has the ability to reduce
transactional costs associated with international contracts, by
potentially reducing the “[r]isks arising from unfamiliarity with foreign
legal process” and the “[r]isks arising from unknown and unpredictable
legal exposure.”287 The way in which the interpretation as “exclusive”
diminishes the transaction costs is by increasing certainty. If parties
cannot be sure where they can be sued they obviously take this
uncertainty in account in the negotiation of the agreement. The
decrease of transaction costs would be an advantage for the competition
of American companies in the worldwide market. 288
In addition, reasons of both history and international uniformity
support the view that FSCs should be interpreted as exclusive. The
presumption in favor of interpreting FSCs to be permissive is a relic of
a past in which FSCs were disfavored because they ousted the courts of
jurisdiction. As Bremen and Carnival Cruise clearly show, judicial
disfavor of FSCs is no longer the case. Therefore, historical
development favors a shift from a presumption in favor of interpreting
a FSC as permissive to a presumption in favor of finding such a clause
to be exclusive.
International uniformity also supports a shift from a presumption
of permissiveness to one of exclusivity. In the European Union,
exclusivity is the rule.289 The Hague Convention adopts a presumption
in favor of exclusivity.290 Exclusivity is the rule in arbitration.291 As
discussed above, the law governing arbitration and FSCs is slowly
converging. Uniformity between these two methods of dispute
resolution also supports a shift from a presumption that such clauses are
permissive to one of exclusivity.

V. CONCLUSION
In Bremen, the Supreme Court reversed the historical judicial
antagonism to FSC and established a strong presumption in favor of the
enforceability of such clauses. However, Bremen included a number of
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Spigelman, supra note 143, at 7.
This is one of the Supreme Court‘s concerns in Bremen. See Bremen,
407 U.S. at 9.
289
See Volner, supra note 136.
290
See supra notes 149-55 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 216-26 and accompanying text.
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possible limitations on the enforceability of FSC, especially the
requirement of reasonableness, that create uncertainty (and basis for
litigation) about such clauses. This article has argued that the Court
should abandon these limitations in enforcing FSC in international
commercial contracts. Instead, such clauses should be subject to the
general standards for enforceability of any contract. Reasons of
freedom of contract, economic efficiency, history, and international
uniformity support this change in the law.
While the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements
resolves many issues associated with the enforceability of FSCs, the
ratification of the Convention by the United States will leave a number
of questions unanswered. The grounds for unenforceability of a FSC
under the Convention are quite broad and ill-defined. Moreover, many
international commercial contracts are not subject to the Hague
Convention. General principles of U.S. law regarding FSCs will
continue to apply to these contracts.
If the Hague Convention goes into effect, courts will have an
opportunity to reexamine the grounds for refusing to enforce a FSC.
The argument of this paper—that grounds for refusing to enforce FSC
should be limited to ordinary contract grounds, excluding
reasonableness, unfairness, and inconvenience—is therefore
particularly timely and important at this moment before the Convention
takes effect.
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